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Yes — UK authorities and some lawmakers have been actively pursuing legal and technical routes that could force companies to give state access to encrypted data and that proponents describe as on-devi...
Legal and technical limits on tracing IPs and devices in CSAM investigations balance powerful investigative tools against privacy and encryption protections: U.S. law requires providers to report “app...
Internet service providers (ISPs) face a contested and evolving legal landscape about liability for users who download pirated content: courts and advocates in 2025 show a strong pushback against broa...
Metadata—timestamps, filenames, file sizes, geotags, device identifiers, IP addresses and delivery logs—can point investigators to who accessed or shared CSAM even when message content is end-to-end e...
Law enforcement-run honeypots implicated in CSAM investigations sit at the intersection of several federal statutes (notably the PROTECT Act reporting duties to NCMEC, federal CSAM criminal statutes, ...
Automatic caching or background cloud backups can leave users with copies of images they did not intend to keep, and defense arguments have arisen around lack of knowledge or automatic processes rathe...
ISPs can and do monitor and log user connections and may be required by law or court order to record or act on visits to websites deemed illegal; methods include DNS/IP blocking and deeper inspection,...
The UK Technical Capability Notice (TCN) issued to Apple under the Investigatory Powers Act demanded that Apple maintain the capability to provide access to data stored in its iCloud Advanced Data Pro...
End‑to‑end encryption (E2EE) substantially reduces platforms’ technical ability to scan message content for known child sexual abuse material (CSAM), meaning traditional server‑side hashing and AI det...
Lawmakers, regulators and platforms rely on a mix of legal limits, technical controls and process rules to try to prevent misuse of seized CSAM datasets and to protect uninvolved people — most promine...
Brazil’s 2014 Marco Civil da Internet established safe-harbors: intermediaries are generally liable for third‑party content only after a specific court order (Article 19) . In mid‑2025 the Supreme Fed...
Evolving privacy and encryption debates in 2025 are tightening the trade‑offs between law enforcement access to metadata/device forensics and civil‑liberties protections: U.S. bills like the STOP CSAM...