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Analyses and scholarship focusing on the intelligence failures that led to the 9/11 attacks and the reforms needed to prevent similar tragedies, including better interagency communication and clearer priorities.
The Bush administration’s policies and the wider U.S. intelligence apparatus combined to produce avoidable vulnerabilities before 9/11 through a mix of missed warnings, weak information-sharing, shift...
The CIA’s withholding of crucial information about two future hijackers from the FBI before 9/11 reflected a mix of institutional stovepipes, operational secrecy and disputed judgment calls, not a sin...
The 9/11 Commission concluded that failures of information sharing—between the CIA, the FBI, and other agencies—were central to the missed warning signs before September 11, 2001, and it made concrete...
The 9/11 Commission concluded that the U.S. government did not cause the attacks but was plagued by systematic failures—failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management—that left it unabl...
On September 11, 2001, 19 al‑Qaeda militants hijacked four U.S. airliners, flying two into the World Trade Center towers in New York, one into the Pentagon, and one that crashed in Pennsylvania after ...
The surviving paper and digital passports linked to several of the September 11 hijackers were physically recovered in multiple locations, examined as part of the FBI’s PENTTBOM investigation, and rep...