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Methods used to de-anonymize Tor users, including metadata leaks, active network-level attacks, and direct compromises of endpoints or hidden services.
Tor prevents an ISP from reading the contents of web requests or learning the final sites visited because traffic is encrypted and routed through multiple relays . However, ISPs can usually tell that ...
.onion addresses (Tor onion services) keep client and server traffic inside the Tor overlay so there is no traditional “exit” hop that can observe plaintext or IP endpoints, unlike standard HTTPS over...
Live-network studies and recent research converge on a clear but nuanced conclusion: Tor’s default (bandwidth-weighted, guard-based) path-selection leaves users exposed to multi‑AS colluding adversari...
Researchers have used a range of traffic-correlation techniques to deanonymize Tor onion services, from large-scale passive correlation across ISPs to active, protocol-level manipulations that induce ...
For hiding the fact of which sites are visited from a local ISP, a multi-hop VPN scheme often branded as “Secure Core” gives clearer protection because the ISP only sees an encrypted tunnel to the VPN...
Empirical work over the past decade has not produced a single, universal "success rate" for deanonymization of modern Tor clients by AS‑level adversaries; instead, measurement studies report the fract...