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The ability of law enforcement to deanonymize Tor users through targeted techniques and exploits.
Tor exit nodes are the point where encrypted Tor traffic re-enters the public Internet, creating both a privacy boundary and an exposure point: exit operators can see plaintext when the application-la...
Operational slip-ups—poor OPSEC, outdated or misconfigured software, long-lived Tor circuits, and mistakes tying anonymized activity to real-world identifiers—are the dominant causes of deanonymizatio...
Operation Onion Peeler— the FBI’s investigation that targeted Silk Road and related Tor hidden services—did not “break” Tor’s cryptography but demonstrated that targeted law-enforcement techniques, op...
Timing-correlation (a.k.a. traffic correlation or end-to-end confirmation) attacks match patterns of packet timing and volume observed at the client side with patterns observed at the destination side...
Timing-analysis defenses such as Vanguards and recent Tor protocol and client updates materially raise the bar for deanonymization — they reduce success rates of many published timing and correlation ...
Operational mistakes—user actions and misconfigurations—are the single most common route to deanonymizing Tor users; investigators and researchers repeatedly find client-side errors, poorly configured...
Operational security failures — not cryptographic weakness in Tor itself — are the single biggest pathway from “anonymous” to identified and prosecuted, with courts and researchers showing that user e...