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Traffic-correlation attacks against Tor, which use timing, packet-size, and volume fingerprints to reveal who is talking to whom, despite Tor's layered encryption.
Traffic-correlation (end-to-end) and boundary-monitoring attacks identify who is communicating through Tor by statistically matching traffic patterns observed near the client (entry) and near the dest...
Exit (egress) nodes are the Tor network’s interface with the open internet and therefore can observe and manipulate traffic destined for clearnet services, while Tor “onion” or hidden services avoid t...
(end-to-end) and timing attacks against Tor match patterns of traffic entering the network to patterns leaving it to reveal who is talking to whom; Tor’s design deliberately does not defend against ad...
Timing and traffic-correlation attacks have been repeatedly demonstrated in research and used in practice to de‑anonymize Tor users when adversaries can observe or influence both ends of flows, with r...