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The U.S. government's sanctions on Venezuela, including restrictions on financing and equity transactions with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.
Mar‑a‑Lago has not been seized; it remains President Trump’s private club and residence, and reporting shows it has hosted events and presidential announcements there . Federal agents did execute a se...
Two competing international-law narratives have been advanced about U.S. sanctions and the recent use of force in Venezuela: proponents argue sanctions and limited coercive measures are lawful economi...
The narrative of Venezuela’s 2007 and related nationalizations has been a persistent lever in U.S. policy and media: framed alternately as evidence of expropriation of American property, proof of anti...
U.S. sanctions since 2019 have not simply reduced Venezuela’s export volumes; they have re-engineered how barrels reach Chinese buyers by forcing Caracas, Chinese state firms, private “teapot” refiner...
U.S. government policies have acted as both an enabler and an obstacle to oil companies seeking to recover expropriation awards from Venezuela: U.S. courts and some executive actions have converted ar...
Restoring Venezuela’s refineries to meaningful operation will be a phased, multi-year process: some limited output and commercial flows can resume within months under a coordinated external program, b...
Documented abuses under Nicolás Maduro’s government include widespread extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, enforced disappearances and systematic restrictions on fre...
Venezuela’s options to defend itself from U.S. military, economic, or covert pressure combine legal, diplomatic, asymmetric military, economic-leverage, and domestic-control measures; each carries lim...
United States sanctions and recent U.S. military actions have materially weakened the practical—and therefore legal—enforceability of oil-for-loan arrangements between Venezuela and its Chinese and Ru...
Studies estimating excess mortality linked to sanctions on Venezuela deploy a mix of survey-based excess-death calculations, macroeconomic counterfactual modeling, and import/health-service flow analy...
Hugo Chávez’s 2007 nationalization consolidated state control over oil projects in the Orinoco belt and forced foreign firms, including U.S. majors, to cede operational control to PDVSA, prompting exi...
Venezuelan constitutional texts establish broad rules for public office and nationality but do not, in the provided materials, set out a clear, single statutory regime on when legislators may accept m...
Between 2006 and 2016, U.S. crude oil imports from Venezuela declined materially from levels often cited around 1.4 million barrels per day in the mid‑2000s to roughly 291 million barrels for the full...
International courts and law‑enforcement agencies have been pulled into the Venezuela crisis through a mix of longstanding indictments, an abrupt U.S. law‑enforcement framed operation to seize Nicolás...
Other states and international institutions have reacted to allegations of U.S. actions under President Trump with a mix of sharp diplomatic condemnation, legal analysis from international experts, pr...
Venezuela nationalized and expropriated foreign oil assets in waves beginning in 1976 and again under Hugo Chávez in the 2000s, actions that deprived U.S. oil firms of operational control and led to m...
Venezuelan assets abroad that have been targeted to satisfy investor‑state awards include foreign subsidiaries of state oil companies (most notably Citgo), frozen state funds held in foreign accounts,...
Venezuela has engaged with mining companies and created joint ventures since 2016, but reporting and public records in the provided sources do not show clear, documented cash settlements or completed ...
U.S. sanctions and shifts in U.S. policy have not erased arbitration awards against Venezuela, but they have materially altered how—and how easily—creditors can turn those awards into recoveries by co...
Venezuela’s collapse from production peaks of roughly 3–3.5 million barrels per day to under 1.1 million in 2025 is the result of both prolonged domestic mismanagement and the targeted effects of U.S....