ConocoPhillips Venezuela

Checked on December 21, 2025
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Executive summary

ConocoPhillips’ long-running dispute with Venezuela stems from the 2007 nationalisation of three oil projects and has produced multiple arbitration wins for the company—ICC and ICSID awards totaling billions—followed by a patchwork of enforcement actions and settlements aimed at recovering those sums amid Venezuelan economic collapse and sanctions [1] [2] [3]. Recent developments include U.S. licences to press claims against PDVSA assets abroad and court orders in jurisdictions such as Trinidad to seize payments, but collection remains difficult given PDVSA’s constrained finances, competing creditors and political obstacles [4] [5] [6].

1. The original injury: expropriation of ConocoPhillips assets in 2007

ConocoPhillips’ grievance traces to Venezuela’s 2007 move—under President Hugo Chávez—to restructure and then effectively expropriate international partners’ stakes in projects in the Orinoco Belt and offshore, notably the Hamaca, Petrozuata and Corocoro ventures, leaving ConocoPhillips’ affiliates claiming unlawful takings and reduced contractual rights [3] [2].

2. Arbitration victories: layered awards and their scope

International tribunals have sided with ConocoPhillips repeatedly: an ICC award of about $2 billion for breaches by PDVSA was rendered in 2018 and publicised by ConocoPhillips, and an ICSID tribunal ordered roughly $8.7 billion (plus interest) in 2019 over the expropriation of the three projects—together forming the legal backbone for ConocoPhillips’ enforcement campaign [1] [2] [3].

3. From judgement to enforcement: seizures, settlements and court manoeuvres

Winning awards has been only the start; ConocoPhillips pursued enforcement in multiple jurisdictions, seizing PDVSA-linked assets such as refinery interests in Curaçao in prior years and obtaining a Trinidad court order to appoint a receiver to seize PDVSA payments tied to a Caribbean gas project, reflecting a strategy of targeting PDVSA revenue streams and foreign assets to satisfy awards [7] [5]. The company also reached at least one settlement with PDVSA to recover around $2 billion and suspended enforcement while payments were scheduled, underscoring that negotiable resolutions have coexisted with litigation [8] [1].

4. U.S. licences and the geopolitics of recovery

In 2024 ConocoPhillips secured U.S. licences intended to let it navigate sanctions and pursue Venezuelan assets and payments as part of its collection strategy; media reporting framed those licences as positioning the company advantageously among creditors and enabling targeted seizures without implying a resumption of on‑the‑ground operations in Venezuela, where ConocoPhillips has not operated since the 2007 seizures [4] [9]. These licences and enforcement moves are inseparable from geopolitics: U.S. sanctions, PDVSA’s shifting asset footprint and Western concerns about Venezuelan governance complicate both the legal and practical calculus of recovery [4] [10].

5. Practical obstacles and competing narratives

Despite legal victories, collection faces real limits: Venezuela’s fiscal collapse, PDVSA’s diminished production and a backlog of creditor claims (reported awards and claims exceeding tens of billions) make actual payment uncertain, and tribunals and courts can decide entitlement but lack easy means to compel cash from a state whose assets and cash flows are constrained or politically shielded [6] [3]. Rival perspectives frame ConocoPhillips either as a rightful creditor enforcing the rule of law or as a corporate actor seeking leverage through foreign courts against a sovereign weakened by internal mismanagement and external sanctions; some reporting emphasizes the deterrent effect of nationalisation on investment while other sources note the complexity of collecting awards when sovereign liquidity is low [4] [6].

6. What the record does and does not show

The available reporting documents tribunal awards, settlements, court enforcement actions and U.S. licences enabling recovery efforts, but public sources do not provide a definitive accounting of how much ConocoPhillips has actually collected to date in total nor do they prove future successful collection; where specifics are absent in the cited reports, it is necessary to acknowledge that the amount ultimately recovered remains contingent on further legal steps, geopolitical shifts and negotiated deals [1] [8] [6].

Want to dive deeper?
How much of the ICSID and ICC awards has ConocoPhillips actually collected from PDVSA to date?
What legal mechanisms have other creditors used to enforce judgments against Venezuela and PDVSA, and with what success?
How have U.S. sanctions and licence regimes changed enforcement options for companies seeking to collect awards from sanctioned states?