Which Venezuelan oil projects (by name) were expropriated in 2007 and which companies originally operated them?
Executive summary
In 2007 the Venezuelan government moved to take operational control of major foreign-run heavy‑oil projects in the Orinoco Belt, most notably seizing ExxonMobil’s Cerro Negro and La Ceiba projects and the assets tied to ConocoPhillips’ Petrozuata, Hamaca and Gulf of Paria interests; those projects had been operated by ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips respectively [1] [2] [3]. Other international companies — including Chevron, Total, BP and Statoil — agreed to revise contracts and keep minority stakes while PDVSA assumed majority control [3] [4] [5].
1. The core expropriations: project names and original operators
The clearest, repeatedly reported pair of expropriations are ExxonMobil’s Cerro Negro and La Ceiba projects, which the company cites as the basis for multi‑year arbitration claims after it declined to migrate them into PDVSA‑led joint ventures in 2007 [1] [6]. ConocoPhillips’ principal losses in the same wave are commonly identified as the Petrozuata, Hamaca and Gulf of Paria ventures, assets that ConocoPhillips subsequently pursued in international arbitration over the government’s change of terms [2] [7].
2. How the 2007 policy was implemented and who stayed or left
Hugo Chávez’s 2007 push required foreign operators to cede operational control and accept PDVSA majority stakes; several firms — notably Chevron, Total, BP and Statoil — agreed to the new structure and retained minority shares, while ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused and were effectively removed from operational control, prompting the state to transfer their operations to PDVSA [3] [4] [5] [7].
3. Litigation, compensation claims and the continuing dispute
The fallout from the 2007 measures produced protracted legal fights: ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips pursued arbitration and large compensation claims — Exxon reported a nearly $1 billion entitlement in 2023 tied to those expropriations and ConocoPhillips won multi‑billion dollar awards related to its seized investments — illustrating that the companies view Cerro Negro, La Ceiba, Petrozuata, Hamaca and Gulf of Paria as core to their claims [1] [8] [7].
4. Where reporting converges and where caveats remain
Multiple mainstream accounts converge on Exxon’s Cerro Negro and La Ceiba and ConocoPhillips’ Petrozuata, Hamaca and Gulf of Paria as the most prominent seized projects and attribute the moves to the 2007 renegotiation requirement; contemporaneous and retrospective sources also emphasize that other international partners accepted new minority roles rather than being expelled [1] [2] [3] [5]. The available reporting, however, varies in scope and sometimes summarizes the expropriations as broader “asset seizures” without listing every affected joint venture, so this summary sticks to project names explicitly cited in multiple sources [1] [2] [3].
5. Political context and competing narratives
Narratives differ sharply: Venezuelan policy and allied commentators framed the 2007 measures as rightful reclamation of national resources and negotiated restructurings with compensation mechanisms, while the affected multinational firms and many Western outlets framed the moves as expropriations that required restitution through arbitration — both frames are reflected in the reporting and explain why legal disputes and diplomatic tensions have lingered [9] [7] [10].