What would be the short- and long-term GDP effects of mass deportation according to independent economic studies?
Executive summary
Independent economic studies consistently find that mass deportation would shrink U.S. GDP in both the short and long term, with short‑run shocks ranging from roughly 1–7 percent below baseline within a few years and longer‑run persistent losses of several percent depending on the scale and duration of the policy [1] [2] [3] [4] [5].
1. Immediate macroeconomic shock: how big and how fast
Macro‑modeling and scenario analyses show that GDP losses begin quickly: Peterson Institute scenarios projecting deporting millions find GDP could be 1.2 percent below baseline by 2028 in a low‑deportation scenario and as much as 7.4 percent below baseline in a high‑deportation scenario within four years [2] [3], while Penn Wharton projects a 1.0 percent GDP drop by 2034 under a 4‑year policy and 3.3 percent under a 10‑year policy, signaling that short‑term scale and enforcement intensity matter [1].
2. Medium term: amplification through labor, prices and demand
Studies using computable general equilibrium (CGE) and other macro models find the initial labor‑force contraction (often estimated around 4–5 percent of the workforce in major scenarios) reverberates through lower output, weaker consumer spending, and sectoral bottlenecks that amplify losses to GDP and can raise prices in affected goods and services; one CGE study finds a roughly 4 percent supply‑side recession and persistent real GDP declines through 2040 [5] [4] [2].
3. Long run: persistent shrinkage versus partial adjustment
Across independent reviews and modeling exercises, the consensus is that losses are not fully reversed: long‑run GDP is lower than the no‑deportation baseline because capital accumulation, industry composition, and productivity suffer when large shares of workers — many concentrated in agriculture, construction, and food services — are removed; multiple studies estimate multi‑year to decadal losses in the 2.6–7.4 percent range depending on assumptions about how many are removed and whether new entrants replace them [6] [4] [3] [5].
4. Geographic and sectoral asymmetry: concentrated hits increase national drag
Regional and sectoral studies make clear the national GDP effects are uneven: California analyses find undocumented workers generate about 5 percent of state GDP directly and up to 9 percent including spillovers, with agriculture and construction facing double‑digit contractions without these workers — localized collapses that spill into national GDP through supply‑chain and demand linkages [7] [4].
5. Fiscal offsets and enforcement costs do not erase GDP losses
Reports emphasize that the fiscal calculus worsens rather than mitigates GDP effects: the direct fiscal savings from removing tax‑paying residents are small relative to enforcement and administrative outlays (which studies model as adding hundreds of billions), and lost tax revenues and smaller economic activity deepen short‑ and long‑term output declines [1] [8] [4].
6. Points of uncertainty and alternative interpretations
Models differ in assumptions about labor market adjustment, substitution between native and immigrant workers, enforcement costs, and spillovers to remittances and trade, producing a range of outcomes — some lower estimates (around 1–2 percent shortfalls in modest scenarios) and some higher estimates (4–7 percent or more when deportations are large and sustained) — but even the most conservative independent analyses find net negative GDP effects [2] [1] [6] [4] [3]. Some proponents argue deportations could boost native wages or reduce unemployment; the empirical models cited in these studies generally find those gains are outweighed by lost demand, disrupted production, and long‑run capital‑labor effects [1] [3].
7. Bottom line — scale, duration, and persistence determine magnitude
Independent studies converge on the qualitative verdict: mass deportation reduces GDP in both the short run (within a few years) and the long run (years to decades), with estimated GDP reductions centered in the low‑single digits for smaller or shorter policies and reaching mid‑ to high‑single digits for large, sustained deportation scenarios; the policy’s ultimate GDP toll depends on how many people are removed, how quickly industries and capital adjust, and the fiscal and enforcement choices that accompany deportation [2] [4] [3] [5] [6].