What have independent economic analyses said about the long-term effects of Trump-era tariffs and trade policies?

1. The near‑unanimous direction of effects: higher prices, weaker growth, and job losses

A broad swath of independent research and prominent policy shops finds tariffs act like a tax on consumers and firms, raising costs, depressing consumption and investment, and squeezing employment in net terms; the Tax Foundation summarized multiple studies concluding tariffs have “raised prices and lowered economic output and employment” since 2018 ^[1], while CEPR argued the tariff spree disrupted macroeconomic paths and threatened prosperity ^[4].

2. Quantifying the long‑term hit: wide range, but some very large estimates

Quantitative work differs on scale but not sign: the Penn Wharton Budget Model projects an especially large long‑run contraction from the April 8, 2025 tariff schedule — roughly an 8% GDP decline and a 7% drop in wages, with middle‑income households facing lifetime losses on the order of $58,000 under their “as‑if” steady‑state modeling assumptions ^[2]; Yale’s Budget Lab and other university analyses similarly put the average effective tariff well above historical norms and estimate persistent output and distributional losses ^{[5] [6]}.

3. Winners, losers, and distributional realities

Tariff analysis repeatedly emphasizes distributional consequences: while tariffs raise government revenue — the measures brought in hundreds of billions in 2025 according to reporting — the burden falls unevenly on consumers and downstream firms that rely on imported inputs, and long‑run wage and lifetime income losses hit households across age and income groups in many independent models ^{[3] [2]}. Local studies, such as the New York City Comptroller’s report, warned of weaker job growth and fiscal strain in major metro areas ^[7].

4. Trade balance, revenue and the short‑term puzzle

Some metrics complicate the simple “tariffs are bad” story: the trade deficit narrowed in 2025 as imports fell and pre‑tariff importing surged earlier in the year, and tariff receipts rose substantially, shrinking headline deficits and raising revenues ^{[3] [8]}. Analysts including Jeffrey Frankel and others note that many high tariffs were not fully in effect in 2025, delaying full macroeconomic impact, which partly explains why the economy did not collapse immediate ly ^[6].

5. Uncertainty, retaliation, and second‑round effects that worsen outcomes

Independent research flags uncertainty and retaliation as force multipliers of harm: firms delay investment amid policy gyrations, trading partners may retaliate, and higher inflation expectations complicate monetary policy — effects that independent house accounts and municipal studies identify as central channels by which tariffs inflict larger, persistent economic costs than simple static models capture ^{[9] [7] [4]}.

6. Alternative perspectives and caveats in the literature

Some financial‑sector analysis stresses geopolitical strategy and “de‑risking” rather than full decoupling, arguing a hard long‑term split is unlikely and that selective carve‑outs could blunt some damage (J.P. Morgan), while journalists and academics note that measured near‑term impacts have been smaller than feared because of pauses, partial implementation, and substitution effects ^{[10] [6]}. Independent modelers uniformly warn, however, that these caveats change magnitudes not the sign of effects: tariffs remain contractionary on average ^{[2] [5]}.

Conclusion: a consensus on direction, debate on scale and timing

Independent analyses agree on direction — tariffs act like regressive taxes that raise prices, reduce investment and output, and redistribute income away from consumers and many workers — but they disagree on timing and magnitude, with some models projecting catastrophic long‑run losses (Penn Wharton) and other commentators emphasizing delayed or partially mitigated effects due to pauses, carve‑outs and short‑run adjustments ^{[2] [6] [10]}. Legal uncertainty and policy reversals add further downside risk to growth and confidence, making the long‑term economic picture worse than simple revenue or deficit numbers imply ^{[11] [7]}.