Who has paid for the bulk of tariffs in the united states in 2025?

1. Early 2025 — firms took the hit while markets front‑ran tariffs

When tariffs were first announced and implemented in early 2025, importers and domestic firms absorbed a large portion of the added costs: researchers at the Peterson Institute for International Economics conclude that through mid‑2025 “American consumers were not bearing much of the tariff burden” and that U.S. firms were compressing spreads between purchase and selling prices to eat most of the tariffs ^[1]. That pattern was reinforced by import surges as firms and consumers front‑ran tariffs, creating a spike in imports early in the year that later collapsed ^[4].

2. By late 2025 the balance shifted toward consumers

Multiple analyses show the burden moving toward consumers as firms stopped cushioning higher input costs; by October 2025 Benn Steil and others estimated importers’ share of the tariff incidence fell to roughly 27 percent while about 55 percent was being passed on to consumers and around 18 percent borne by exporters ^[2]. Commentators and policy analysts warned that prolonged tariffs would increase pass‑through, meaning the shield businesses provided in the short run would erode and consumer prices would rise if tariffs persisted ^{[5] [6]}.

3. Official and model‑based tallies: revenue up, incidence depends on timing and assumptions

Treasury and customs receipts surged in 2025—Yale’s Budget Lab and other trackers documented very large increases in customs duty revenues and calculated that tariff rates raised the effective U.S. tariff rate sharply above historical norms (TBL estimated a 14–16 percentage‑point increase in the average effective tariff rate across several updates) and recorded hundreds of billions in duty collections for 2025 ^{[7] [8] [9] [4]}. The Congressional Budget Office incorporated behavioral responses and now projects higher tariff revenue over 2025–2035 than earlier expected because foreign exporters lower prices only partially (CBO projects exporters cut prices by about 5 percent of the tariff increase), which implies domestic consumers and firms still face most of the eventual cost ^[10].

4. Estimates vary — methodological choices explain the split

Differences across Goldman Sachs, Tax Foundation, academic trackers, and think tanks reflect methodology (pre‑substitution vs. post‑substitution, short run vs. long run), the presence of exemptions, and timing: some measures record the “pre‑substitution” welfare hit to consumers before buyers switch suppliers, yielding larger consumer burdens (TBL), while firm‑level surveys show small and medium businesses reported sharply higher tariff rates and evolving expectations about pass‑through, which affects pricing choices ^{[8] [5]}. Analysts also note exemptions for key product categories and legal uncertainty (IEEPA litigation) that change both revenue flows and who ultimately pays ^{[10] [11]}.

5. Bottom line — businesses and consumers, not foreign exporters, bore the bulk, but the split changed over 2025

Across credible sources there is broad agreement that foreign exporters did not bear most of the 2025 tariff burden; instead U.S. businesses and U.S. consumers absorbed the vast majority, with firms absorbing more in the immediate aftermath and consumers taking on a larger share as the year progressed and pass‑through rose ^{[1] [2] [3] [12]}. Precise percentages diverge by dataset and timing—estimates cited range from splits like 40/40/20 (consumers/businesses/exporters) to studies showing firms initially bore most of the cost before consumer pass‑through increased—so any definitive single number for “who paid the bulk” depends on whether the short‑run window or the longer run is the focus ^{[13] [2] [1]}.