What was the executive order that was signed to keep top secret government programs classified in interest of national security and what aspect of Apollo program was national security

Checked on February 7, 2026
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Executive summary

Executive Order 13526, signed December 29, 2009, is the current governing order that prescribes how the executive branch classifies, safeguards, and declassifies national security information and therefore underpins the legal regime that keeps “top secret” programs classified [1] [2]. Earlier orders — notably Executive Order 12356 and its antecedents such as EO 12065 and EO 12958 — established the modern framework for classification and were superseded or amended over time, but EO 13526 is the operative text cited across federal guidance [3] [4] [5]. The reporting provided does not include primary documentation or authoritative sourced claims that identify a specific aspect of the Apollo program as classified for national security reasons, so that part of the question cannot be answered from the supplied material.

1. Which executive order governs modern classification: EO 13526 and its authority

The most recent and commonly referenced executive order for classifying national security information is Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” signed in late 2009 and published as the baseline for classification, declassification, safeguarding, and review procedures across executive agencies [1] [2]. EO 13526 defines the categories of information that may be classified — including military plans, intelligence activities, foreign relations, scientific and technological matters relating to national security, and programs for safeguarding nuclear materials — and sets standards for original classification authority, declassification timelines, and special access programs [1] [6] [2]. Federal agencies and implementing directives (including guidance from the Information Security Oversight Office and departmental regulations) operationalize EO 13526 across departments like State, Commerce, and DHS, which explicitly tie their classification procedures to EO 13526 [7] [8] [9].

2. Predecessors and continuity: why EO 13526 sits atop a longer lineage

The current order did not arise in isolation; it supersedes and refines prior executive orders that created the uniform system for classifying and declassifying national security information. Executive Order 12356 established many of the core elements — a uniform system, mandatory review processes, and limits on improper uses of classification — and has been referenced and preserved in archival records and agency histories [3] [10] [11]. EO 12958 (issued later and subsequently amended) and earlier EO 12065 are part of that lineage; federal materials and the National Archives explicitly link those texts together as the legal scaffolding for modern classification practice [5] [4]. Administrative guidance and Federal Register notices routinely reference EO 13526 as the controlling document while acknowledging this history [12].

3. What “keeps” top-secret programs classified under EO 13526

EO 13526 sets the substantive and procedural thresholds for classification: information may be classified only if an authorized original classifier determines that unauthorized disclosure “could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security” and that the information falls within enumerated categories such as military plans, intelligence sources and methods, or sensitive technological matters [1] [6]. The order also prescribes time limits (automatic declassification at 25 years except for enumerated exceptions), special access program accounting, appeal and oversight mechanisms like the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, and sanctions for improper handling or improper classification [2] [1] [6]. Agencies implement these rules through directives, departmental regulations, and security offices that operationalize the “need-to-know,” clearance, and safeguarding requirements that keep particular programs at Top Secret or Special Access Program status [7] [8].

4. The Apollo program claim: limits of the supplied reporting

The supplied search results and official documents outline the legal architecture for classification but contain no explicit, sourced statement identifying which aspect of the Apollo program (if any) was held secret on national security grounds; none of the provided snippets or documents discuss Apollo-era program-level classification decisions or claim a particular Apollo component was classified as a national security program (p1_s1–[6]5). Because the available reporting does not document any specific Apollo-related classification determination, it is not possible, on the basis of these sources alone, to assert which Apollo aspect was treated as a national security secret or to evaluate competing historical claims without introducing outside sources.

5. What to read next to resolve the Apollo question

To answer whether and how Apollo had classified national-security aspects requires sources beyond the EO texts: declassified NASA files, National Archives holdings about NASA/CIA/DoD coordination, contemporary Presidential or agency memoranda, or scholarship on Cold War space security. The federal orders explain why such decisions would be lawful and how they would be implemented, but they do not themselves identify particular historical program-level secrets [1] [2].

Want to dive deeper?
Which NASA or Department of Defense records discuss classification or special access for Apollo-era hardware or missions?
How did EO 13526 change declassification timelines and procedures compared with EO 12356 and EO 12958?
What declassified documents reveal Cold War-era coordination between NASA, the CIA, and the Department of Defense on lunar or reconnaissance capabilities?