How do China and Russia help Venezuela evade sanctions

1. Oil purchases and intermediaries: the commercial lifeline

A core channel for sanctions evasion has been continued purchase and refining of Venezuelan crude by firms and state actors linked to China and Russia, often routed through trading houses or subsidiaries that mask origin and ownership; Rosneft and other Russian-linked intermediaries have been named as middlemen that helped ship Venezuelan oil to buyers including China, India and third countries ^{[7] [8] [1]}. Chinese demand for discounted Venezuelan crude provided Caracas with hard currency and political cover, and U.S. and policy groups note that Beijing is the largest buyer of Venezuelan oil—an economic lifeline that complicates tight enforcement ^{[9] [1]}.

2. The shadow fleet and maritime obfuscation

To get sanctioned cargoes to market, Venezuela and partners have relied on a “shadow fleet” of tankers that obscure movements by switching off AIS transponders, spoofing locations, reflagging, and conducting dangerous ship‑to‑ship transfers at sea; these practices have been documented by maritime analysts, Reuters and the Atlantic Council as a standard means to move crude to China and elsewhere while evading sanctions scrutiny ^{[7] [10] [1]}. U.S. seizures and media accounts of so‑called ghost fleet vessels—like the tanker Skipper—highlight how these maritime tactics enable sanctioned oil flows and compel targeted enforcement actions ^{[11] [12]}.

3. Financial workarounds: banks, netting and opaque intermediaries

Sanctions evasion also runs through alternative financial plumbing: U.S. designations have targeted banks and subsidiaries alleged to be economic lifelines—Evrofinance Mosnarbank, Venezuelan BANDES subsidiaries and shadow netting arrangements for payments have been reported—while China’s development financing and on‑the‑books loans complicate Treasury efforts because some flows were routed through Venezuelan banks or approved channels ^{[7] [3] [4]}. Analysts warn that opaque ownership and third‑country intermediaries—including entities in the UAE, Turkey and offshore jurisdictions—have become repositories for Venezuelan debt and proceeds, blurring lines between legal trade and evasion ^[7].

4. Newer channels: crypto, re‑exporting and replicated tactics

Observers at the Atlantic Council and other research centers report that Venezuela has adopted digital tools used by Russia, Iran and North Korea—accepting oil payments in stablecoins and using sanctioned exchanges or crypto rails to move value—creating emerging, harder‑to‑trace pathways that mirror a broader “axis of evasion” ^[2]. Meanwhile, re‑exporting through third countries and using non‑sanctioned carriers to transport Venezuelan oil to final buyers have been documented as repeat strategies used to disguise origin ^[10].

5. Limits, competing narratives and open questions

Not all sources agree on how far Beijing and Moscow will go: some reporting notes that Chinese and Russian material support has at times waned—reflecting their own sanctions exposure, geopolitical calculations, and economic constraints—so assertions of full‑throttle assistance risk overstatement ^{[5] [6]}. Official U.S. policy pieces urge tighter secondary sanctions and targeting of facilitators in China and Russia, but public reporting also shows gaps in enforcement and evidence chains that make attribution and legal action challenging ^{[9] [4]}. The available sources substantiate maritime, financial and crypto workarounds as key mechanisms, but they leave open how centralized or state‑directed those evasions are versus private or semi‑private commercial actors ^{[3] [8]}.