Which circuits have held that § 111 requires common-law simple assault and what are their leading opinions?

1. Which circuits have said § 111 requires common‑law simple assault — the short list and their leading opinions

The Tenth Circuit squarely held that “every conviction under § 111 requires an assault” in United States v. Kendall, which relied on United States v. Wolfname (the Tenth Circuit’s Wolfname decision elaborating why assault is an essential element) ^[2]. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly stated that convictions under § 111(a) “require at least some form of assault,” most prominently in United States v. Chapman, 528 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2008), and model jury materials in the Ninth Circuit reflect that interpretive stance ^[3]. The Third Circuit has treated § 111 as creating distinct offenses including simple assaults and other assaultive variants and thus recognizes a common‑law assault component in its framework, as reflected in McCulligan and compiled Third Circuit decisions ^[4].

2. The core reasoning those circuits deployed

Those circuits anchor their holdings in textual and historical reading: they interpret the statute’s penalty structure (which separately prescribes punishment for “simple assault” versus aggravated varieties) and the statute’s use of assault‑language to mean Congress incorporated the common‑law understanding of simple assault into the statutory elements, not merely as labels for possible conduct ^{[5] [6]}. The Tenth Circuit’s Wolfname/Kendall line emphasizes that the statute’s structure and legislative history support reading assault as an element rather than treating the six verbs in § 111(a) as interchangeable alternatives that could render “assault” surplusage ^{[2] [5]}.

3. The opposing view in other circuits and the leading rejecting opinion

The Seventh Circuit rejected the element‑of‑assault approach in United States v. Stands Alone, holding that § 111(a) can be violated by committing any one of the six listed acts — “forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes” — so the government need only prove commission of at least one listed act, not the historic common‑law assault ^[7]. That opinion criticized the “assault‑as‑element” reading as contrary to the statute’s plain language and warned that importing common‑law definitions would render five of the six verbs superfluous ^[7]. The Stands Alone decision was the focal point for the Supreme Court petition that framed the issue as a multi‑circuit split ^[1].

4. How deep and recognized the split is — procedural posture and stakes

The petition in Stands Alone, filed to the Supreme Court, explicitly described a split among seven courts of appeals: three circuits holding that common‑law simple assault is required and four circuits taking the contrary view, underscoring that the disagreement is circuit‑wide and cert‑worthy ^[1]. Petition materials and advocacy briefs argue that Congress’s 2008 amendments and contemporaneous legislative commentary—cited by proponents of the assault‑element view—support the common‑law incorporation thesis, while the decisions rejecting that view lean heavily on plain‑language and canon arguments to preserve the statutory alternatives ^{[5] [7]}.

5. Limits of available reporting and unresolved questions

The assembled sources identify the three pro‑element circuits and the Seventh Circuit’s leading contrary decision and reference a broader multi‑circuit split, but the materials do not provide a complete, contemporaneous catalog of all four circuits that have rejected the element rule or a comprehensive list of every leading case on each side beyond those highlighted ^{[1] [7]}. The Supreme Court materials and advocacy briefs frame the conflict and cite key decisions ^{[5] [1]}, but where source documents are silent, this report does not assert additional holdings or outcomes.

Conclusion

The Tenth (Wolfname/Kendall), Ninth (Chapman), and Third (McCulligan line) Circuits have been identified in the record as requiring proof of common‑law simple assault for some § 111 convictions, while the Seventh (Stands Alone) and multiple other circuits have rejected that reading — a division formalized into a petition to the Supreme Court that frames the question as an entrenched circuit split ^{[2] [3] [4] [7] [1]}. Where sources do not list every contrary decision by name, the existence of conflicting holdings is confirmed but the full map of dissenting circuit opinions is not exhaustively recorded in the provided materials ^[1].