What federal statutes and case law most directly address “indistinguishable” computer‑generated child pornography?

1. The core statutory text: 18 U.S.C. § 2256 defines “indistinguishable”

The single most important statutory provision for “indistinguishable” computer‑generated material is the definitional section, 18 U.S.C. § 2256, which expressly covers digital and computer‑generated images that are “indistinguishable” from a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct and explains that “indistinguishable” means virtually indistinguishable to an ordinary viewer ^{[1] [3]}.

2. The enforcement statutes that apply those definitions: §§ 2251, 2252, 2252A

Prosecutions of production, possession, receipt, distribution and transportation rely on statutes that incorporate § 2256’s definition: § 2251 (sexual exploitation/production) and the possession/transportation/distribution statutes § 2252 and § 2252A, the latter of which specifically addresses computer‑generated images and material “indistinguishable from” child pornography ^{[2] [4] [5]}.

3. Obscenity and drawings: 18 U.S.C. § 1466A as a parallel weapon

Where images are fictional or artistic but obscene, § 1466A reaches obscene visual depictions of minors — including drawings or computer‑generated work — that are legally obscene, giving prosecutors an alternate statutory route even when the material is not literally indistinguishable from a real child ^{[6] [7]}.

4. What the Supreme Court and lower courts have said: Ashcroft, jury fact‑finding, and limits

The Supreme Court struck down certain broad bans on simulated child pornography in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition , invalidating parts of the Child Pornography Prevention Act, but it did not invalidate the narrower statutory language that targets images indistinguishable from real children; lower courts have therefore treated § 2256(C) and morphing provisions as potentially constitutional while emphasizing jury determinations and context ^{[3] [2] [8]}.

5. Circuit case law and evidentiary concerns: virtual images vs. real‑child prosecutions

Circuit decisions illustrate tension: prosecutors argue the indistinguishable language prevents defendants from escaping liability by claiming images are synthetic, while defenses press the risk of false positives and First Amendment claims; the legislative history cited in congressional materials warns that without a prohibition of indistinguishable images enforcement would be crippled ^{[2] [7] [8]}.

6. Practical implications, evolving tech, and unresolved gaps

Department of Justice guidance and legal commentators assert that federal law already covers hyper‑realistic AI CSAM and that §§ 2252A/2256 are primary tools, but many state statutes lag and some statutory contours (e.g., what constitutes “ordinary person” perception, how juries should be instructed, and how to treat images created without any real‑child input) remain contested and fact‑specific in litigation ^{[9] [10] [5]}.

7. Competing narratives and enforcement agendas

Advocates for broad coverage stress child protection and law enforcement practicality, pointing to statutory language and sentencing consequences for possession or distribution, while civil liberties advocates and some defense attorneys warn of overbreadth, technology error, and chilled speech risks following Ashcroft — each side’s emphasis reflects institutional agendas (prosecutors seeking tools to prosecute trafficking vs. free‑speech defenders wary of expansive criminalization) ^{[9] [3] [5]}.