Is possession of child sexual abuse material legal anywhere in the world today?
Executive summary
Laws in most high‑income jurisdictions and many international instruments criminalise the production, distribution and possession of child sexual abuse material (CSAM); for example, U.S. federal law prohibits possession and related acts under 18 U.S.C. §2252A [1], and the EU is advancing a regulation to force platforms to prevent dissemination of CSAM [2] [3]. Available sources do not list any country or major jurisdiction that currently openly legalises possession of CSAM; coverage instead focuses on new restrictions, enforcement powers and proposals to regulate detection and AI‑generated material [2] [3] [4].
1. Laws already criminalise possession in major jurisdictions — enforcement is active
Federal U.S. law “generally prohibits the production, advertisement, transportation, distribution, receipt, sale, access with intent to view, and possession of child pornography” under 18 U.S.C. §2252A, and U.S. agencies actively investigate and prosecute possession alongside other CSAM offences [1] [5]. This demonstrates both substantive criminalisation and operational enforcement in the United States [1] [5].
2. Europe is tightening platform obligations rather than creating loopholes
European governments have recently agreed a Council position on a proposed regulation that would oblige digital companies to prevent dissemination of CSAM and allow national authorities powers to order removal, blocking or delisting of results; the push is toward mandatory platform duties, not legalising possession [2] [3]. The legislative debate has been contested — Parliament and civil‑liberties actors raised concerns about scanning and surveillance — but reporting shows the Council’s aim is stronger industry obligations and an EU Centre to support implementation [2] [3] [6].
3. Policymakers are responding to AI‑generated imagery with new laws and testing regimes
Governments such as the UK are introducing laws to prevent AI systems from being misused to create synthetic CSAM, and to empower designated bodies (AI developers, child‑protection organisations) to inspect models; these moves treat AI‑created material as illegal and to be prevented at the source [4] [7] [8]. The rise in reported AI‑generated images reported by the Internet Watch Foundation — rising from 199 in 2024 to 426 in 2025, with infants and girls disproportionately represented — is central to these policy shifts [7] [4].
4. Some proposals spark civil‑liberties pushback but the intent is protection, not liberalisation
Media coverage of the EU debate highlights a heated fight between child‑rights and law‑enforcement groups on one side and privacy advocates on the other; critics fear indiscriminate scanning, while proponents argue the rules are necessary to disrupt abuse online [3] [6]. The public dispute concerns detection methods and oversight; none of the cited sources suggest these debates seek to decriminalise possession of CSAM [3] [6].
5. Law enforcement sometimes seeks controlled access for investigations — not a legal safe harbour
Reporting from Australia describes proposals or laws that would give police limited legal protections to possess and share CSAM for investigative purposes to catch offenders, framed as “controlled and legally sanctioned use” rather than a broad legality for private possession [9]. This distinction matters: operational exceptions for investigators do not equate to legal permissiveness for the public [9].
6. International instruments and awareness campaigns reinforce prohibition trends
Treaties and organisations working on child protection — e.g., the Council of Europe’s Lanzarote Convention and its monitoring — continue to treat child sexual exploitation as a criminal and policy priority, reinforcing global norms against CSAM [10]. Public‑facing efforts and national observances underline the global consensus that children must be protected and that exploitation is a criminal matter [10] [11].
7. What the available sources do not say (limits of reporting)
Available sources do not provide a comprehensive, country‑by‑country catalogue proving every national statute; they also do not identify any jurisdiction openly legalising private possession of CSAM. If you need a definitive, jurisdictional map of statutes and penalties worldwide, that is not found in current reporting and would require country‑level legal research beyond these sources (not found in current reporting).
Conclusion — how to read the landscape: reporting from major democracies and supranational bodies shows a clear, reinforcing trend: possession and related CSAM acts are criminalised and actively policed [1] [5], new laws are being adopted to address platform responsibilities and AI threats [2] [4] [7], and proposals to expand investigative exceptions do not amount to legalisation for the public [9]. Available sources do not document any place where private possession of CSAM is legally permitted.