How did Judge Lewis Kaplan and the Second Circuit describe the Carroll verdict in later rulings and opinions?

1. Kaplan framed the Carroll verdict as dispositive and fact-establishing

Kaplan repeatedly described the jury’s verdict in Carroll I not merely as a liability finding but as one that settled core factual questions for subsequent litigation, instructing that the earlier jury’s findings about sexual abuse and defamation would be accepted as fact in the second trial limited to damages ^{[4] [5]}; he wrote that the first jury’s verdict “plainly established” the facts necessary to resolve related issues in later proceedings ^[1].

2. Kaplan’s blunt treatment of post-trial appeals: “frivolous” and categorical

When Trump sought to stay or appeal Kaplan’s rulings on immunity and evidentiary matters, Kaplan concluded the appeal lacked merit and formally certified it as “frivolous,” finding that Trump “had not provided a single reason” showing a likelihood of success and denying a stay—language that underscored the judge’s view that the core rulings were sound ^[2].

3. The Second Circuit upheld Kaplan and the damages as reasonable

A three‑judge Second Circuit panel affirmed the substantial defamation award against Trump, endorsing Kaplan’s handling of the case and concluding that, in light of the “extraordinary and egregious facts,” the punitive damages did not exceed reasonableness and that the jury’s damages awards were fair and reasonable ^{[3] [6]}. The court rejected Trump’s immunity arguments and his bids to disturb the verdict, thereby ratifying Kaplan’s legal framework for treating the earlier jury findings as operative in the defamation phase ^{[3] [6]}.

4. Counterarguments voiced by Trump’s lawyers and amici — and how the courts responded

Trump’s appellate briefing characterized Kaplan’s evidentiary rulings as prejudicial and argued that the verdict was a “miscarriage of justice” that “severely damages the presidency,” contending the judge prevented the defense from presenting “critical evidence” and misapplied federal rules ^{[6] [7]}; the Second Circuit, however, expressly rejected those contentions in its opinion, finding no reversible error in Kaplan’s rulings and upholding both liability findings and the damages calculation ^{[3] [6]}.

5. How Kaplan’s language and the appeals court’s tone shaped public and legal perceptions

Kaplan’s authoritative phrasing — treating the jury’s findings as effectively binding for subsequent litigation and using procedural sanctions language such as “frivolous” — sent a signal that the district court regarded the verdict as robust and legally conclusive ^{[1] [2]}, and the Second Circuit’s lengthy, per curiam analysis reinforcing the reasonableness of punitive damages further cemented that view: appellate judges emphasized the sustained nature of Trump’s attacks and the harms proven at trial when explaining why the award fit within legal bounds ^[3]. That consolidation of district‑court framing and appellate endorsement diminished the practical avenues for overturning the verdict absent Supreme Court intervention ^{[3] [6]}.

6. Limits of the available reporting and competing narratives

The reporting shows Kaplan’s and the Second Circuit’s characterizations and the contours of the appeals fight, but it does not record every word of the courts’ opinions nor every evidentiary ruling in microscopic detail; press summaries capture the courts’ central holdings and tone — Kaplan’s insistence on the jury’s de facto establishment of facts and the Second Circuit’s defense of the damages as reasonable — while also reflecting the defense’s persistent contention that the trial process was flawed ^{[2] [3] [6]}. Where sources report defense assertions of judicial error, the appellate court explicitly rejected them; where there is not documentary text in these snippets, this summary does not invent additional judicial language beyond what the sources provide ^{[7] [6]}.