How do local jails and private contractors partner with ICE to hold detainees?

1. How the formal plumbing works: contracts, IGSAs and bed leases

ICE secures space for detainees by contracting directly with private prison firms and by arranging Intergovernmental Service Agreements (IGSAs) with counties and local jails that then supply beds to ICE—sometimes contracting those same services back out to private operators—letting ICE rapidly scale capacity without a single unified detention model ^{[1] [2] [6]}. Counties may lease out jail space for immigrant detention and ICE is authorized to pay for additional beds beyond a contracted ceiling, which creates a practical separation between physical capacity and contractual capacity ^{[3] [7]}.

2. Private contractors: running facilities, transport and specialized services

Large private prison companies such as GEO Group and CoreCivic operate many detention sites under ICE contracts and provide a wide range of services including facility management, security staff and medical care, while a broader constellation of contractors supplies transport, telecommunications and administrative support for removals and case processing ^{[1] [8] [9]}. ICE has also awarded big and sometimes no‑bid contracts for so‑called “immigration enforcement support teams” and transportation grids that move detainees between local arrest points and detention sites ^{[3] [10]}.

3. Workarounds and procurement choices: why IGSA and no‑bid matter

Advocates and reporting show that IGSA arrangements and modifications of existing agreements let ICE and contractors sidestep some federal procurement requirements, a strategy that accelerates bed acquisition but reduces transparency and local oversight—an approach critics say enables contractors to “dodge local democracy” and expand detention even where opposition exists ^{[2] [11] [3]}. Journalistic investigations and watchdog analyses document the use of no‑bid contracts and rapid modifications to preexisting deals to meet a sudden “compelling urgency” for more beds ^{[3] [12]}.

4. The local calculus: revenue for counties, business for corporations

Counties and private firms receive direct payments for housing detainees, and private prison companies have seen revenue boosts tied to expanded ICE demand; analysts call this a burgeoning “deportation‑industrial complex” in which public dollars flow to corporate operators as ICE expands capacity ^{[4] [5] [9]}. The financial incentives can influence local political dynamics—jurisdictions and firms may favor building or reopening facilities because of expected contracts and jobs, even amid community resistance ^{[11] [13]}.

5. Operational consequences: networks, overcapacity and decentralization

The result is a decentralized network in which local police, county jails, private contractors and ICE form a “closed loop” for identification, transport and detention: local arrests feed contractor transport teams which move people into privately run centers or county jails holding ICE detainees ^[10]. That patchwork contributes to mismatches between contractual capacities and physical populations—cases of facilities exceeding contractual ceilings and varied conditions across sites have been documented ^{[7] [14]}.

6. Competing interpretations and stakes for accountability

Supporters argue contractors provide necessary surge capacity and logistical expertise to carry out federal removal priorities quickly; critics warn the same structures blunt democratic control, obscure procurement choices, and prioritize beds and profit over oversight and detainee welfare—reporting and analyses from government watchdogs, advocacy groups and investigative outlets all present variants of these stakes ^{[3] [2] [5]}. Public data and investigative reporting document the growth in contractor obligations and record detention increases, but gaps remain in fully mapping every subcontractor relationship and its human impacts ^{[8] [9]}.