How do local police-ICE collaborations work in practice and what agreements govern them?
Executive summary
Local police–ICE collaboration is built primarily on Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, under which ICE can delegate specified immigration-enforcement functions to trained state or local officers via memoranda of agreement; in practice that delegation takes distinct forms (jail models, warrant-service models, task‑force variants) that vary in authority, point of contact and operational scope [1] [2] [3]. The program has been rapidly expanded and incentivized by DHS and ICE, generating sharp debates about public‑safety gains, civil‑rights harms, local costs and police‑community trust [4] [5] [6].
1. Legal scaffolding: 287(g) and the memoranda that bind local agencies
The statutory hook is Section 287(g) of the INA, added by the 1996 law, which authorizes ICE to delegate certain immigration‑officer duties to state, local and tribal officers “under ICE direction and oversight,” and those delegations are implemented through memoranda of agreement (MOAs) that spell out which duties are authorized and what training and supervision are required [1] [7].
2. The models on the ground: jail, warrant‑service, and task‑force distinctions
ICE and partner trackers describe at least three practical models: the Jail Enforcement (or jail‑based) model, in which deputies screen, interview and process people booked into jails and may issue ICE hold requests; the Warrant Service Officer (WSO) model, which deputizes officers to execute ICE administrative warrants inside correctional facilities without full interrogation authority; and the Task Force model, the most expansive option that deputizes certified officers to identify, arrest, interrogate and transport suspected noncitizens in routine policing contexts [3] [2] [5].
3. Day‑to‑day mechanics: training, access, holds and information flows
Agreements require designated training and ICE supervision so officers can use immigration databases, interview inmates about citizenship, lodge administrative detainer/hold requests that can keep someone in custody up to 48 hours for ICE pickup, and—depending on the MOA—serve ICE warrants or directly arrest for immigration violations; ICE also maintains a Law Enforcement Assistance hub and templates for letters of interest and MOAs to streamline enrollment [7] [3] [2] [1].
4. Incentives, expansion and federal pressure
DHS and ICE have actively promoted and in some states even incentivized participation—offering reimbursement, performance awards and political pressure—leading to dramatic growth in partners (DHS announced more than 1,000 partnerships and ICE materials tout financial awards), while state laws in some places now require or push agencies to cooperate with ICE, changing the calculus for local chiefs and sheriffs [4] [8] [9].
5. Outcomes, critiques and competing narratives
Independent analysts and advocacy groups contend that 287(g) has often targeted low‑level offenses, been costly to localities, and damaged police‑community trust—making victims and witnesses less likely to report crimes—while civil‑liberties organizations warn of racial profiling and misuse; ICE and DHS frame partnerships as tools to remove “the worst of the worst” and boost public safety, revealing an explicit policy agenda that prioritizes removals even as critics emphasize civil‑rights and policing tradeoffs [5] [6] [4] [9].
6. Oversight, limits and political controversy
MOAs and ICE oversight are the formal checks, and ICE says designated officers operate “under supervision,” yet past policy shifts have eliminated some guardrails (for example the 2012 discontinuation of some models and later reinstatements), and local resistance—city policies limiting cooperation, state laws curtailing ICE actions, and civil‑legal challenges—constitute the principal external constraints; reporting and watchdog groups continue to track enrollments and outcomes because formal federal oversight and transparency remain politically contested [5] [10] [11] [3].