How have Mexican cartels adapted precursor sourcing for fentanyl since 2020?
Executive summary
Since 2020 Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have moved from importing finished fentanyl from abroad toward building a resilient, vertically integrated supply chain: buying precursor chemicals and “pre-precursors” through opaque broker networks, synthesizing fentanyl inside Mexico, and adapting when foreign controls tighten [1] [2] [3]. This adaptive strategy leans heavily on China-origin chemical supplies while exploiting alternative suppliers (notably India), less-regulated chemical intermediates, concealment tactics in trade, and sophisticated financial workarounds [4] [5] [2] [6].
1. China still central, but the flow shifted from finished product to precursors
Multiple official and expert accounts show China-based companies and brokers remain the principal source of fentanyl precursor chemicals and equipment, but after scheduling and enforcement shifts around 2019–2020 shipments increasingly took the form of precursor and pre-precursor chemicals destined for Mexican producers rather than finished fentanyl shipped directly to consumers [5] [1] [7]. U.S. and academic observers trace this evolution to Chinese regulatory moves that made direct fentanyl exports harder and to cartels’ preference for local synthesis in Mexico, where small quantities of precursors can yield large volumes of product [4] [1].
2. Diversification: India, brokers, and pre-precursors fill the gaps
When China tightened controls on ANPP and NPP, networks shifted some production and sourcing to India and other locations, and cartel-linked buying networks learned to purchase earlier-stage chemicals (“pre-precursors”) that fall outside stricter controls [4] [2]. Investigations and reporting document sophisticated broker chains that identify alternative chemical suppliers and rebrand or split shipments to evade detection, enabling cartels to maintain inputs even as specific molecules are scheduled [2] [8].
3. Tactical substitutions and the use of less-regulated chemicals
U.S. oversight and international scheduling prompted cartels and their chemistry partners to adapt recipes and inputs, substituting less-restricted reagents and reformulating manufacturing processes to use chemicals that face weaker controls — a pattern flagged by the GAO and other analyses as cartels “adapting to chemical restrictions” [9] [8]. This technical flexibility reduces the effectiveness of single-chemical bans because criminal chemists can retool production lines around alternate precursors or multi-step pathways that begin with legal industrial chemicals [2] [8].
4. Concealment in trade and logistics: mislabeling, parceling, and trafficking routes
Precursors and pre-precursors are concealed in legitimate-looking shipments—everything from mislabeled bulk cargo to small parcel mail—often routed through third countries or hidden inside apparently ordinary products, making interception by customs and regulators difficult [10] [8]. Enforcement reporting and industry studies also document the use of Chinese and global money-movement and brokerage networks that facilitate payment and logistics for these chemical flows [1] [6].
5. Building synthesis capability inside Mexico and scaling production
Since 2020 Mexican cartels have dramatically increased domestic production capacity—Mexican authorities reported far larger seizures and many more clandestine labs as production moved in-country—allowing cartels to convert imported precursors into fentanyl and press pills locally, which is cheaper and lowers the risk of losing finished shipments in transit [8] [3]. U.S. and Mexican reporting characterize groups such as Sinaloa and CJNG as central actors in this domestic manufacturing expansion, buying machinery like pill presses from abroad as part of the verticalization [11] [7].
6. Financial and policy countermeasures, limits of reporting, and alternate views
U.S. agencies (FinCEN, Treasury, DEA) and analysts emphasize the cartels’ financial workarounds—money-laundering conduits, cash payments, and Chinese-linked laundering networks—that keep precursor procurement flowing despite sanctions and advisories [6] [12]. Some congressional witnesses and experts stress China remains the linchpin supplier and argue focused diplomatic pressure is the right lever, while other analysts warn that banning individual chemicals simply shifts the market to pre-precursors and alternate countries, signaling the limits of supply-side controls alone [5] [1]. The available sources document these adaptation pathways clearly, but open-source reporting cannot always trace every middleman or quantify how much supply now comes from India versus China, so precise market shares remain uncertain [2] [7].