How have local courts in Minneapolis and Chicago ruled on prosecutions of anti‑ICE protesters using whistles or following agents?

1. Minneapolis trial judge: a clear curb on reactive tactics

In Minnesota a federal judge issued an extensive order enjoining ICE from arresting, detaining, tear‑gassing or using pepper spray against peaceful protesters who are not obstructing agents and expressly held that a vehicle safely following immigration officers “does not, by itself, create reasonable suspicion to justify a vehicle stop,” language that protects whistle‑blowing and shadowing tactics used by local activist networks ^{[1] [2] [5]}.

2. Appeals courts push back: stays and legal reversals

That trial‑court restraint did not stand: the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals put an indefinite hold on the Minnesota judge’s order, effectively allowing federal agents to resume more aggressive crowd‑control measures while litigation continues ^{[3] [6]}. Fortune, The Guardian and other outlets reported the appeals court’s decision to lift the lower court’s limits pending further proceedings ^{[3] [6]}.

3. Chicago’s legal posture mirrored — but is less publicly documented in this reporting

Multiple summaries of the litigation landscape indicate that separate lower‑court injunctions in both Minneapolis and Chicago were stayed by appellate courts, meaning the Chicago order that had sought to restrict agents’ responses to observers and followers was also paused by a higher court ^[4]. The available reporting in the provided set does not include a full transcript or detailed opinion from the Chicago trial judge, so the precise Chicago district‑court language and scope are not fully described in these sources ^[4].

4. What the orders actually aimed to protect — and why judges issued them

Judges who imposed restrictions framed them around constitutional protections for peaceful assembly and the right to record and observe law enforcement, reasoning that tactical responses by federal officers — including vehicle stops of followers or the use of chemical agents against non‑obstructive observers — risked violating First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights unless officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause ^{[1] [4] [2]}. Legal guides and civil‑liberties groups noted the injunctions required agents to articulate suspicion of a federal offense before stopping a vehicle, an explicit guardrail against retaliatory stops ^[4].

5. The government’s counterargument and the practical effect of appeals stays

The Department of Homeland Security and federal lawyers argued that the injunctions unduly constrained officers’ ability to protect themselves and the public during volatile enforcement actions, a rationale that helped secure appellate relief lifting the limits in Minnesota and, according to consolidated coverage, similarly affecting Chicago litigation ^{[3] [6] [4]}. The appellate stays mean that, in the short term, federal agents regained broader discretion to stop vehicles and deploy nonlethal crowd‑control measures while the courts sort substantive rights and immunities.

6. Open questions, competing narratives and reporting limits

Reporting shows judges sought to protect observers and followers from reactive arrests and vehicle stops, but appellate courts have intervened, creating ongoing legal uncertainty ^{[1] [3]}. The sources document the Minnesota decisions and appellate stays in detail but provide only summary treatment of Chicago’s lower‑court order and its stay, so definitive statements about the precise Chicago trial‑court language or subsequent local prosecutorial practices cannot be made from the materials supplied here ^[4].