What are the penalties for doxing federal law enforcement officers under 18 U.S.C. § 119?
Executive summary
18 U.S.C. § 119 criminalizes the public disclosure of certain "restricted personal information" about covered individuals—including federal officers—and, upon conviction, authorizes fines and imprisonment of up to five years [1] [2]. The statute applies narrowly to defined categories of persons and particular harmful intents; other federal statutes (e.g., federal stalking, threats, or obstruction provisions) can carry different or higher penalties for related conduct [3] [1] [4].
1. What § 119 actually forbids and who it protects
Section 119 targets the public release of "restricted personal information" about specific covered persons—such as officers and employees of the United States and certain state or local personnel whose information is made public because of participation in federal investigations—and thus does not criminalize every instance of online publication of contact details [3] [5]. The textual scope in the congressional drafting and Justice Department filings frames the law as a protection for those "performing certain official duties," meaning application depends on whether the target fits the statute’s enumerated categories [2] [5].
2. The baseline penalty under § 119
The statutory penalty for violating § 119, as reflected in congressional summaries and recent bill texts, is a fine under Title 18, imprisonment for not more than five years, or both; that five-year ceiling appears repeatedly in congressional bill language and legal primers discussing § 119 prosecutions [1] [2] [6]. Department of Justice charging documents describing 18 U.S.C. § 119 also characterize the offense as carrying federal criminal penalties for making restricted personal information public about covered individuals [5].
3. Mens rea and purpose matter to exposure and punishment
Prosecutions under § 119 have focused on knowing disclosures and, in some modern legislative variants, require a wrongful purpose—such as intent to obstruct a criminal or immigration enforcement operation—meaning courts and prosecutors weigh both the act of disclosure and the actor’s intent when seeking the statutory penalties [2] [1]. Reporting and bill text tied to the "Protecting Law Enforcement from Doxxing Act" show legislative moves to tie the prohibition to obstructive intent in certain contexts, which influences charging decisions and the applicability of the five‑year penalty [2].
4. Other federal statutes that can apply and their penalties
Doxing conduct that includes threats, attempts to intimidate, or actions that constitute stalking may be charged under other federal laws with different severity: the federal cyberstalking statute (18 U.S.C. § 2261A) and federal threat or obstruction statutes have been used in doxing-related prosecutions and can carry separate penalties and elements prosecutors may prefer depending on facts [1] [4]. For example, federal threat statutes have statutory maxima that can reach ten years where threats target judges or federal officers, illustrating that related conduct may produce penalties higher than § 119’s five‑year maximum in appropriate cases [4].
5. Limits, defenses, and practical enforcement realities
Legal practitioners and commentators stress that § 119 applies to a narrow class of victims and specific kinds of "restricted" information, so ordinary publication of a name or address about non-covered individuals often falls outside the statute; in such cases civil claims or state crimes may be the alternative remedies rather than § 119 charges [7] [8]. Additionally, prosecutions require proof of knowing disclosure and—depending on legislative language relied upon—potential proof of obstructive or intimidating intent, leaving room for First Amendment and factual defenses in many cases [2] [7].
6. The policy debate behind the penalties
Advocates for tougher § 119 enforcement and bills like the Protecting Law Enforcement from Doxxing Act argue the statutory fine-and‑five‑year prison penalty is needed to deter targeted campaigns that endanger officers, while civil‑liberties voices caution against overbroad drafting that could chill oversight and reporting of official misconduct; both perspectives shape how Congress and prosecutors calibrate penalties and charging choices [6] [9].