What appellate decisions have held § 111 requires a specific intent to assault a federal officer, and how did they reason?

1. Ninth Circuit: § 111 is a general‑intent crime and requires merely some form of assault

The Ninth Circuit’s practice and model jury instructions treat § 111 as a general‑intent offense, explaining that convictions “require at least some form of assault” but do not hinge on proof of a particular subjective intent to harm beyond the intentional commission of the assaultive conduct itself (citing United States v. Jim and related authority) ^{[2] [1]}. Those instructions define a “forcible assault” broadly (e.g., an intentional strike, willful attempt to inflict injury, or an intentional threatening coupled with apparent ability) and explicitly state that voluntary intoxication is not a defense because § 111 is general intent in that circuit ^{[1] [2]}.

2. Tenth Circuit: conflicting language, but earlier precedent limits later panels

The Tenth Circuit’s published docket materials reveal a messy doctrinal history: petitioners have argued that decisions such as United States v. Gonzales (931 F.3d 1219) reflect a view that § 111 requires specific intent, but the court has acknowledged panel decisions containing language pointing toward a specific‑intent rule while also stating it was bound by earlier controlling precedent that declined to read such a requirement into the statute ^[3]. The Tenth’s opinion history therefore creates ambiguity—some opinions read like they demand a heightened mens rea, while other Tenth decisions and the court’s stare‑decisis approach preserve a general‑intent reading ^[3].

3. DOJ and federal practice: focus on forcible acts and reasonable apprehension, not uniform specific intent

The Justice Manual and related DOJ materials emphasize that a “forcible act” or even a threat that reasonably causes an officer to anticipate bodily harm can satisfy § 111, signaling the government’s operational position that proof of an assaultive act (not a separate, specific intent to assault a federal officer) suffices in many circumstances ^{[4] [5]}. That guidance is consistent with federal prosecutorial practice and with model jury treatments in circuits like the Ninth, reinforcing the prosecutorial view that § 111 is enforceable without a distinct specific‑intent element in many factual settings ^{[4] [2]}.

4. Defense‑oriented commentary and practice: emphasize intent as a potential defense point

Defense practitioners and firms routinely highlight intent as a central contested issue, arguing that lack of deliberate intent to assault or to impede a federal officer can be a viable defense strategy—an emphasis that reflects both the statutory elements and the patchwork of appellate language on mens rea ^{[6] [7] [8]}. These sources do not, however, establish appellate holdings requiring specific intent; rather they show how defense counsel exploit ambiguities in panel decisions and jury instructions to argue for acquittal or lesser charges ^{[6] [8]}.

5. Where reporting leaves gaps and what that means for the legal question

The available materials summarize circuit positions and DOJ guidance but do not provide a comprehensive list of every appellate decision that has expressly held § 111 requires specific intent; the collected sources show clear authority for the Ninth Circuit’s general‑intent rule and reveal conflicting Tenth Circuit language, but they do not allow a definitive catalog of all appellate courts that have formally embraced a specific‑intent requirement ^{[2] [3] [1]}. Absent a full survey of published opinions (which the supplied reporting does not include), the most defensible claim is that at least the Ninth treats § 111 as general intent, the Tenth contains contradictory panel language with some suggestions of specific‑intent reasoning, and the DOJ treats threats and forcible acts as sufficient—leaving the precise national contours unsettled ^{[2] [3] [4]}.