Supreme Court has stated that, “as a general rule, it is not a crime for a[n undocumented immigrant] to remain present in the United States.”
Executive summary
The assembled reporting shows the Supreme Court has long treated noncitizens physically present in the United States as “persons” entitled to at least some constitutional protections, and the Court’s precedents draw a distinction between admission at the border, which historically carried fewer protections, and continued presence inside the country, which triggers due process [1] [2] [3]. The precise sentence quoted by the user does not appear verbatim in the provided sources; however, those sources collectively support the broader legal theme that mere presence inside the United States has not been treated by the Court as automatically criminal without statutory action and procedural safeguards [2] [4].
1. The doctrinal baseline: persons within the jurisdiction receive protections
Plyler v. Doe established that undocumented immigrants are “persons” for purposes of constitutional protections and rejected the notion that state law could categorically strip them of equal protection simply because of immigration status [1], and later constitutional annotations synthesize this into a durable line: aliens who have physically entered the United States generally fall under the Due Process Clause and therefore enjoy at least some procedural protections [2] [3].
2. The historical edge: entry vs. continued presence
The Court’s modern jurisprudence draws a boundary between initial, at-the-border admissions—where historically rights were limited—and aliens who have “established connections” in the United States, who may invoke fuller due process rights; the annotated record traces this century-long evolution and cautions that the extent of protection depends on factors like lawful admission, ties to the community, and criminal conduct [2] [4].
3. Tension with enforcement: detention and removal remain robust federal powers
While the Court recognizes due process for those inside U.S. territory, it has also repeatedly upheld significant congressional and executive authority over detention and removal: Demore v. Kim sanctioned mandatory detention in some criminal-removal contexts, and the Court has left open constitutional limits on the duration and conditions of such detention—illustrating that constitutional protections coexist with strong enforcement powers [2] [3].
4. Contemporary friction: the Court’s recent moves and enforcement imperatives
Recent orders and rulings through 2025 illustrate the tension in practice: the Supreme Court stayed lower-court limits on immigration sweeps in Los Angeles and signaled that reasonable-suspicion standards for stops can consider a “totality of the circumstances,” a posture the Department of Homeland Security hailed as validation of enforcement authority [5] [6], while civil-rights groups and immigrant-advocacy organizations warn the same actions will enable racial profiling and expanded sweeps [7] [8].
5. Competing narratives and institutional motives
Government statements frame Court actions as necessary to enforce federal immigration law and public safety (DHS press release) and therefore as victories for rule-of-law and enforcement predictability [6], whereas advocacy groups interpret the same orders as judicial approval for practices that threaten civil liberties and communities of color—an interpretive split that reflects differing institutional agendas: enforcement agencies prioritize removals and operational latitude, advocates emphasize constitutional safeguards and anti-discrimination principles [7] [8].
6. What the provided record cannot confirm—and why that matters
The available sources corroborate the legal theme that presence inside the United States triggers constitutional protections and that removal/detention powers are substantial, but they do not supply the original doctrinal quote the user supplied or identify a single canonical opinion that uses that precise phrasing; therefore, it cannot be affirmed from these sources that the Supreme Court literally stated the exact sentence cited, only that the Court’s body of precedent supports the underlying legal proposition [1] [2] [3].
7. Bottom line: law vs. perception in practice
In sum, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, as reflected in the assembled reporting, supports a principled distinction—entry can be regulated differently, while continued presence on U.S. soil generally brings at least some constitutional protections—but enforcement decisions, statutory schemes, and recent high‑court emergency orders show the practical balance between rights and removals remains contested and fact‑dependent, with competing institutional actors pushing contrasting narratives about what the law permits [2] [3] [6] [7].