How have federal circuits ruled on convictions based solely on browser caches or temporary downloads under §2252/2252A?
Executive summary
Federal circuits have not adopted a single rule; instead appellate courts treat browser-cache and temporary-download evidence as intensely fact-specific, reversing convictions where defendants lacked knowledge of cached files and affirming convictions where the record shows control, intent, or awareness that images were stored on devices under the defendant’s dominion [1] [2]. Leading opinions emphasize that mere online viewing is not automatically criminal possession—courts require proof that the defendant knowingly received or knowingly possessed the material, and that can turn on whether the defendant knew about or accessed cache files or took affirmative steps to preserve images [2] [3].
1. The baseline: “viewing is not possession” and why that matters
Multiple legal summaries and commentary state the doctrinal baseline that simply viewing an image on a website, without purposeful saving or downloading, does not by itself satisfy the knowing-possession element of §2252/2252A; prosecutors therefore must tether convictions to evidence of affirmative acts or awareness that transient files were being stored [2] [3]. This principle undergirds reversals in several circuits where judges found the government failed to prove the required knowing control over cached images [1].
2. Ninth Circuit: knowledge and sophistication can be dispositive
The Ninth Circuit has required proof that a defendant knew about and could access cached files, reversing or criticizing prosecutions where the accused was an unsophisticated user who neither tried to access cache files nor knew of their existence; that line appears in appellate summaries and case law analysis showing the Ninth’s skepticism toward inferring possession from passive browsing alone [2] [4]. At the same time, the Ninth has sustained probable-cause findings in search-warrant contexts when affidavits and technical evidence supported a fair probability that a machine contained contraband—illustrating that the circuit separates probable cause to search from guilt at trial [4].
3. Tenth Circuit: conviction when awareness and continued viewing show control
The Tenth Circuit has affirmed convictions where the record supported that the defendant was aware images were being stored automatically and continued to access them, finding that such conduct can constitute the “knowing possession” required under §2252A(a)(B) [2] [5]. Related Tenth opinions have also addressed charging-count issues—e.g., treating multiple devices in one location as a single possession count—showing the circuit’s granular, context-driven approach to what counts as possession in multi-device investigations [6].
4. Mixed outcomes in other circuits: reversals where knowledge is missing; affirmances where corroborating trails exist
Circuit-level summaries report both reversals for “knowing receipt” or possession when defendants lacked knowledge of cache contents and upholds where stronger evidence of intent or knowledge existed—bookmarks, search histories, shared folders, recovered “lost files,” or other affirmative acts have been decisive in affirmances [1] [7]. The scholarly literature and practice guides caution prosecutors that relying solely on ephemeral browser caches is legally precarious without corroborating proof of dominion, control, or intent [3].
5. What the case law means in practice and where uncertainty remains
The practical takeaway is that convictions based solely on browser caches or temporary downloads are vulnerable unless the prosecution proves the defendant knew about those files or took actions to obtain, keep, or distribute them; appellate courts consistently treat the question as fact-bound and have split outcomes depending on the technical and testimonial context presented at trial [2] [1] [3]. Existing reporting and case digests reveal gaps—there is no single nationwide standard and appellate outcomes turn on nuanced factual records and how courts construe “dominion and control” under §§2252/2252A [3] [1].