What did H.R.1229 (United States‑Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025) authorize specifically for counter‑UAS and anti‑tunnel programs?
Executive summary
H.R.1229, the United States‑Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025, reauthorizes and expands bilateral cooperation on both anti‑tunnel efforts and counter‑unmanned aerial systems (C‑UAS), directs new institutional arrangements in Israel, and increases statutory funding authorizations for those programs [1] [2]. The bill text and subsequent summaries agree on extending anti‑tunnel and C‑UAS cooperation through 2028 and boosting anti‑tunnel funding from $50 million to $80 million, but public reporting differs on the precise C‑UAS annual authorization level and whether the bill creates a separate multiyear $150 million program — signaling real ambiguity between the bill language and advocacy or analysis summaries [1] [3] [4] [2].
1. What the statute specifically changes for anti‑tunnel cooperation
The bill amends the 2016 anti‑tunnel authority (section 1279 of the FY2016 NDAA) to raise the annual authorized amount in the statute from $50,000,000 to $80,000,000 and to extend the program’s expiration date to December 31, 2028 — language that appears directly in the published bill text on Congress.gov [1] [5]. Multiple policy summaries and NGO trackers repeat and contextualize that increase and extension, noting the provision “extends the authorization of the U.S.‑Israel Anti‑Tunneling Cooperative Program to Dec. 31, 2028 and increases the authorization to $80 million per year” [2] [5]. Those changes are framed in the bill as an expansion of joint research and development for tunnel detection and defeat technologies [1] [2].
2. What the statute does for counter‑UAS (program creation, mission, and timeframes)
H.R.1229 establishes or reauthorizes cooperative counter‑unmanned systems efforts under the Department of Defense, directing a formal United States‑Israel program to research, develop, test, and deploy technologies to detect and neutralize hostile unmanned aerial and maritime systems, and explicitly extends U.S.‑Israel C‑UAS cooperation through FY2028 [1] [4] [2]. The bill also mandates the Defense Innovation Unit open an office in Israel within 180 days to engage Israeli defense officials and industry on dual‑use threats, which creates a dedicated institutional pathway for C‑UAS collaboration [1] [5] [4].
3. Funding: the hard numbers — and why they’re contested
On anti‑tunnel funding the bill text is clear: $80 million per year authorized and an extension to 2028 [1] [2]. For counter‑UAS, however, public sources diverge. A number of advocacy groups and summaries describe either an increase from existing figures (e.g., raising an earlier $55 million level to $75 million) or the creation of a far larger, separate United States‑Israel Counter‑Unmanned Systems Program authorized at $150 million annually through FY2030 [2] [6] [3] [4]. The Congressional Research Service and other trackers earlier cited administration reprogramming actions and existing DoD numbers (for example, noting $55 million for C‑UAS in spring 2025 DoD reports), which complicates reconciling those operational budget actions with the bill’s statutory language as printed [6] [7]. In short: anti‑tunnel dollar increases and the 2028 extension are explicit in the bill text, while the precise C‑UAS statutory dollar figure is reported inconsistently across sources and appears conflated in some advocacy summaries with separate programmatic proposals [1] [3] [4] [2].
4. Operational authorities and program focus — detection, neutralization, and institutional ties
Beyond money and dates, the statute emphasizes joint R&D and deployment pathways: it authorizes cooperative work on tunnel detection technologies and C‑UAS systems (detection, tracking, hard‑kill/soft‑kill neutralization), creates a DoD‑level U.S.‑Israel counter‑unmanned systems program, and requires institutional presence (a Defense Innovation Unit office in Israel) to coordinate industry and defense engagement — provisions repeatedly mentioned in the bill text and several policy summaries [1] [5] [4] [2]. Supporters present this as accelerating shared technology development and quicker fielding of C‑UAS and anti‑tunnel tools; critics and some analysts note the legislative language also opens questions about oversight, export control alignment, and how statutory authorizations translate into actual appropriations and program management [4] [8].
5. Bottom line and limits of available reporting
The legislative text clearly amends the anti‑tunnel authorization (raising it to $80M/year and extending to Dec. 31, 2028) and directs the Defense Innovation Unit presence in Israel and the creation/continuation of a U.S.‑Israel counter‑unmanned systems program [1] [9] [4]. Public reporting diverges on the exact annual dollar authorization for the C‑UAS program — with sources variously citing existing DoD figures, a modest increase to ~$75M, or a separate $150M‑per‑year authorizing construct — and available reporting does not fully reconcile those differences against the official bill text [6] [2] [3] [4]. Where the bill text is silent or ambiguous in summaries, reporting fills gaps unevenly; readers should consult the enacted statute and appropriations language for the final, binding funding authorities and implementation details [1].