What recent UK arms exports or licensing decisions involve Israel?
Executive summary
The UK has taken a mixed and contested approach to arms exports involving Israel since late 2023: the Labour government initiated a review on taking office in July 2024 and announced a partial suspension of roughly 30 licences on 2 September 2024, while at the same time a tranche of licences and high-value approvals continued to be issued before and after that suspension [1] [2]. Campaigners and some parliamentary voices characterise post-suspension approvals as a sharp increase — notably single-issue licences worth £127.6m between October and December 2024 — while government officials defend continued, selective licensing as lawful, defensive and necessary to reassure allies [3] [4] [5].
1. The September 2024 partial suspension: scope and stated rationale
On 2 September 2024 the Foreign Secretary announced a pause on around 30 existing export licences out of roughly 350–361 extant licences to Israel, describing the step as a targeted suspension where there was “a clear risk” that exports could facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law [1] [5]. The House of Commons Library briefing documents this government-led review process and notes the suspension was part of a broader reassessment launched on Labour’s accession in July 2024 [1]. The government framed the move as limited and risk-based, not an embargo or blanket halt [1].
2. Licence volumes, values and disputed “spike” claims
Official and campaign data paint divergent pictures about scale: the UK granted licences valued at £42m in 2022 and £18m in 2023 according to parliamentary briefing data, yet campaign groups and investigative reports point to much larger single-issue approvals in late 2024 — £127.6m in single-issue licences between October and December 2024 — and figures of $169m (c.£135m) for the same period from other outlets [6] [3] [4]. Oxfam and CAAT put cumulative licensing since 2015 at hundreds of millions (Oxfam cites at least £500m), while government statements stress that UK exports remain a small share of Israel’s overall defence imports and that assessments are made case-by-case [7] [6] [4].
3. The F‑35 exemption and the argument over components
A focal controversy is the government’s decision to exclude F‑35 component supply from its partial suspension: campaigners say the UK supplies crucial F‑35 parts through UK industry contracts and that these were allowed to continue via third‑country routes, a point critics say undercuts the suspension’s intent [3] [2]. Ministers have defended selective licensing as compliant with export control rules and necessary for relationships with allies, while critics argue components for combat aircraft capable of delivering heavy munitions cannot credibly be termed “defensive” without clearer definitions [3] [8] [5].
4. “Red licences,” extant licences and the parliamentary record
Parliamentary reporting and Hansard show there were some 361 extant licences as of September 2024, with 34 identified as “red licences” — items assessed as potentially usable in operations in Gaza, including components for combat aircraft, military helicopters and targeting equipment [5]. MPs, select committees and researchers have repeatedly raised concerns about transparency and the granular content of licences, and the Commons Library briefing provides the baseline data used in those debates [5] [1].
5. Legal challenges, politics and competing narratives
Two organisations sought judicial review of government decision-making on licences to Israel — a legal track that pre-dates the September suspension and has featured in court hearings where the government defended its risk assessments [1] [8]. Political contention is clear: opposition and campaign groups characterise continued licensing as incompatible with IHL risk assessments, while government sources stress legal advice, allied reassurance and industry ties — and some reporting notes a diplomatic motive to reassure the United States and NATO partners [8] [5] [4].
6. What the reporting shows — and what it does not
Available public briefings, civil society analyses and press reporting converge on several verifiable facts: a government review beginning July 2024, a 2 September partial suspension of ~30 licences, a continued stock of hundreds of active licences, and concentrated controversy over F‑35-related exemptions and late‑2024 licence approvals [1] [2] [5] [3]. What the sources do not uniformly disclose are item‑level end‑use outcomes on the ground or a definitive public accounting of how specific components were routed and used after licensing; those operational details are either classified, commercially sensitive, or outside the scope of the cited material [1] [3].