Ukraine is opening two agencies (Berlin and Copenhagen) to sell surplus and co-produced weapons
Executive summary
Ukraine has announced a controlled export programme to sell surplus and co‑produced weapons abroad and “two sales offices for weapons produced under co‑production” are to open in Europe (reportedly Berlin and Copenhagen), according to presidential and government statements cited in reporting [1]. Kyiv frames the sales as a way to finance urgently needed materiel and scale production while keeping frontline needs protected; defence industry actors say 94.4% of manufacturers are ready to export under strict controls [2].
1. What Kyiv announced: a controlled exports programme, surplus sales and sales offices
Ukraine’s leadership has publicly moved from a near‑total wartime export ban toward a formal, controlled export system designed to sell “surplus” and co‑produced arms to finance further production; the government says a concept for arms exports will be ready by December 2025 and that two European sales offices for co‑produced weapons will be opened, with Berlin and Copenhagen named in reporting [1]. President Zelensky and other officials emphasise safeguards: end‑user certificates, re‑export bans and verification rights to prevent diversion and to ensure frontline needs are not undermined [2].
2. Why Kyiv says it is doing this: finance and scale production
Officials present the move as a fiscal and industrial strategy: sell systems Ukraine produces in quantities beyond its requirements—maritime drones and some anti‑tank systems are repeatedly cited as examples—to raise money to buy and scale production of “urgently needed” systems such as interceptor drones [3] [4]. The government and industry frame the programme as a way to convert battlefield manufacturing success into sustainable funding without compromising defence needs [2].
3. Industry readiness and government controls cited by Kyiv
Ukrainian industry groups say most manufacturers are prepared to export: a survey cited by Ukrainian officials reported 94.4% readiness, and the government describes export measures including mandatory end‑user certificates, re‑export bans and verification rights to limit misuse [2]. Kyiv markets the initiative as “controlled exports” rather than open sales, stressing selection of buyer states that have supported Ukraine [5].
4. Competing viewpoints and risks flagged in reporting
Analysts and past reporting raise two countervailing concerns: first, weapons diversion and illicit secondary markets have been longstanding worries in and about Ukraine; US and Ukrainian lawmakers have previously expressed concerns about final destinations of arms, and watchdog reporting underlines risks of leakage in conflict zones [6]. Second, some observers note political leverage tied to foreign suppliers—continued dependence on US and European systems affects Ukraine’s bargaining position and may shape which co‑production deals proceed [7] [8]. Available sources do not provide a complete independent audit of controls or empirical evidence proving the new safeguards will prevent diversion; that detail is “not found in current reporting.”
5. What types of weapons are likely candidates — and what Kyiv has signaled
Officials and journalists point to categories Kyiv believes it has in surplus or can produce at scale—maritime drones, some anti‑tank systems and certain unmanned aerial systems have been explicitly mentioned—and Zelensky has said exports will avoid systems essential to frontline defence [3] [5]. Reporting stresses that Ukraine’s defence sector has swelled during the war, supplying over 40% of weapons used on the front according to Kyiv’s statements, which the government uses to justify limited exports [5] [2].
6. The diplomatic and market implications: buyers, co‑production and geopolitical checks
Opening sales offices in European capitals signals Kyiv’s intent to institutionalise market access and attract investment and co‑production partners; the plan contemplates joint production lines with international firms and regional sales platforms in Europe and the US [2] [1]. But SIPRI and other datasets show Ukraine remains the largest arms importer in 2020–24 and highly integrated with Western suppliers, meaning Western policy and export controls will influence which co‑production and sales deals are feasible [7].
7. What to watch next (transparency, vetting, and legal framework)
Key metrics to monitor are (a) the detailed export concept Kyiv promised by December 2025 and its legal safeguards, (b) transparency on which weapon types are listed as “surplus,” and (c) how Western partners and export control regimes react to proposed buyers and co‑production agreements [1] [2]. Independent verification and reporting on end‑use compliance will determine whether Kyiv’s controls are effective; current reporting announces ambitions and safeguards but does not yet show long‑term results [2] [1].
Limitations: this analysis relies solely on the supplied reporting, which mainly reflects official Ukrainian announcements, industry readiness claims, and contextual reporting; independent audits of safeguards, buyer lists, or signed sales agreements are not present in the cited sources [2] [1].