Bashar al assad era el Isis?
Executive summary
The relationship between Bashar al‑Assad’s regime and ISIS during the Syrian conflict was complex and pragmatic rather than a simple alliance: substantial reporting and analysis allege that Syrian state actors at times facilitated ISIS’s rise and survival—through tolerance, economic dealings, and tactical accommodations—while other commentators and some sources caution that evidence of direct, deliberate regime control of ISIS remains contested [1] [2] [3]. Competing narratives exist because Assad both fought ISIS militarily and is accused of using ISIS politically to delegitimize and weaken non‑extremist opposition [4] [5].
1. The accusation: Assad’s security apparatus helped build the terror pipeline
Several specialist studies and policy analyses argue Syrian intelligence and the Ba’athist apparatus played an enabling role in the emergence of the jihadi current that became ISIS, by providing cover for foreign fighters traveling through Syria to Iraq and by fostering conditions that helped al‑Qaida in Iraq evolve into ISIS [1] [6]. Authors such as Matthew Levitt and analysts cited by The Washington Institute and Lawfare contend Syrian agencies looked the other way on financial and logistical transactions—bank branches and informal networks continued operating between regime‑held and ISIS‑held areas—suggesting state tolerance if not direct sponsorship [5] [2].
2. The economic evidence: oil, grain and pragmatic trade
Journalistic reporting and think‑tank work document economic interactions between regime elements and ISIS: purchases of fuel and continued banking links in ISIS‑controlled territory, plus reports that ISIS allowed grain and energy flows to government areas for levies, all point to a pragmatic wartime economy in which lines of cooperation could exist even amid combat [7] [3] [2]. Financial Action Task Force reporting cited by analysts found Syrian financial institutions maintained operations that connected ISIS territory to Damascus‑linked headquarters, a structural channel that facilitated transactions [2].
3. The political strategy: “Assad or we burn” and delegitimizing the opposition
Analysts argue the regime deliberately framed the uprising as an existential fight against “terrorism,” using ISIS’s brutality to portray the wider opposition as indistinguishable from jihadists and thereby justify harsh counterinsurgency tactics and retain international support [1] [5]. Lawfare and Washington Institute pieces suggest this strategic calculus made it conceivable that high‑level decisions tolerated ISIS’s survival because the group served a political purpose: weakening moderate rebels and discrediting the revolt [2] [5].
4. Evidence gaps and competing views: collusion vs. coexistence
Critics caution that proving an explicit, operational conspiracy—Assad “controlling” or directing ISIS—is difficult and contested; some commentators argue the evidence for state sponsorship is not as solid as claims that Saddam Hussein sponsored al‑Qaida, and that ISIS fought Assad more than many other opponents during certain periods, complicating any simple collusion thesis [3]. Wikipedia’s compilation of reporting notes both accusations of regime links and analysts who say attempts to show direct regime control lack conclusive proof [3].
5. Tactical accommodations and battlefield dynamics
Beyond economics, observers document episodes where ISIS actions aligned with regime interests—temporary withdrawals, evacuation deals, or attacks that diverted rebel pressure—suggesting episodic tacit coordination or at least mutually exploitable opportunities on the ground [5] [6]. At the same time, major military campaigns against ISIS eventually involved Assad’s forces, Russia, Iran and others, underscoring that the relationship was neither stable cooperation nor pure enmity throughout the conflict [8].
6. Aftermath and changing dynamics
Scholars writing after Assad’s fall note that ISIS benefited at times from the governance vacuum and recruitment drivers present during Assad’s rule, and that Assad’s departure in 2024 changed the operational landscape for ISIS—though assessments caution that dynamics continue to evolve and recovery risks remain [9]. This underscores that the Assad–ISIS story is one of shifting tactical relations inside a wider, brutal war rather than of a single, static policy.
Exact, incontrovertible proof that Bashar al‑Assad personally engineered ISIS’s rise does not appear in the assembled reporting; however, multiple reputable analyses document regime tolerance, economic dealings, and strategic manipulation that materially assisted ISIS at various junctures, even if direct command-and‑control remains disputed [1] [2] [3]. Where primary evidence is absent or contested, this account highlights both the documented practices and the limits of what those practices prove about intent at the highest level [2] [3].