How have Capitol Police policies on use of force and crowd control changed since January 6, 2021?
Executive summary
Since January 6, 2021, the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) rewrote and clarified aspects of its use-of-force and crowd-control posture, adopting explicit prohibitions, new equipment, refresher trainings and an incident-response plan while also expanding interagency coordination and staffing mechanisms; however, implementation has been uneven, many Inspector General and GAO recommendations remain only partially adopted, and officer morale and hesitancy to use force have persisted as operational risks [1] [2] [3]. Reporting shows the agency shifted from reactive improvisation on Jan. 6 to codified guidance, but Congress and watchdogs warn the changes are incomplete, and political developments have complicated public recognition of the attack and the force’s role [4] [3] [5].
1. Clearer written rules and explicit prohibitions—what changed on paper
In the year after the assault, the USCP’s Office of Professional Responsibility revised the department’s Use of Force policy to more explicitly ban chokeholds, trachea holds and pressure with an officer’s knee/leg on a subject’s neck or back, and to require after-action review of Control Device use—changes the report directly attributes to lessons from Jan. 6 [1]. The department also issued guidance and mandatory briefings from the general counsel to walk officers through the updated policy, address misconceptions about legal protection and discuss scenario-based applications of force—steps meant to reduce confusion about when force is lawful [4].
2. New tools, training priorities and doctrine shifts
Operationally, USCP began issuing electronic control devices (stun guns) in October 2021 and committed to expanded crowd-control refresher training and scenario exercises after the GAO concluded officers needed better preparation for violent demonstrations [4] [2]. The GAO explicitly recommended more training on crowd control and refresher courses; USCP publicly acknowledged some of those steps while the agency’s press materials describe bringing in outside planners and former federal agents to rebuild operations planning [2] [6].
3. Command-and-control: critical incident planning and interagency responses
One of the largest shifts was procedural: USCP developed a “critical incident response plan” to enable faster mobilization of outside help—including DoD assets and regional law-enforcement partners—aimed at preventing the jurisdictional and authorization delays that hampered the Jan. 6 response [7]. Congressional action also provided legal pathways for emergency assistance, most notably the Capitol Police Emergency Assistance Act, to reduce friction when outside resources are needed [7].
4. Implementation gap, staffing pressures and morale problems
Watchdogs and congressional testimony show a gap between policy changes and full implementation: the Inspector General reported only a fraction of its recommendations were complete months after Jan. 6, and leadership acknowledged high attrition, mandatory overtime and understaffing that complicate training and sustained change [3] [8]. GAO interviews found officers worried about being “backed” when force is used and expressed hesitancy—an attitude the department has tried to address but not yet resolved [2] [4].
5. Accountability, oversight and contested narratives
USCP instituted dozens of internal investigations into Jan. 6 conduct and has used after-action reviews to inform policy changes, yet external oversight bodies (GAO, IG, Senate committees) have continued to press for clearer emergency procedures and fuller adoption of recommendations [4] [2] [9]. At the same time, political and public debates—illustrated by later efforts to recast the events of Jan. 6—have complicated bipartisan consensus on what reforms should look like and on public recognition of officers’ needs [10] [5].
6. What remains uncertain or unresolved
Reporting demonstrates concrete policy revisions and new equipment/training commitments, but it also documents uneven implementation, staffing shortfalls and continued recommendations from GAO and the IG; available sources do not fully map which specific recommendations remain open today or how operational behavior has changed in subsequent crowd events beyond USCP’s public statements [3] [2] [6]. Independent assessment of whether officers now apply force more quickly, more judiciously, or with greater legal protection is limited in the public record cited here.