Which countries have formally sanctioned the United States since 2020 and what were the stated reasons?
Executive summary
No authoritative evidence in the supplied reporting shows any country formally imposing new, state-level economic sanctions on the United States since 2020; historical examples of retaliatory measures predate 2020 and many of the sources discuss U.S. sanctions programs and pushback rather than newly imposed sanctions on the U.S. after 2020 [1] [2] [3]. Reporting instead documents persistent tensions, rhetorical condemnations, and reciprocal measures enacted earlier or targeted at U.S. policies, while U.S. agencies continue to publish the countries they sanction and defend those programs [3] [4] [5].
1. No documented wave of formal country-level sanctions against the U.S. since 2020 in the available sources
A review of the supplied materials yields no clear instance where a foreign government instituted a formal, economy-wide sanctions regime directed at the United States beginning in 2020; Wikipedia’s survey of historical retaliatory sanctions lists examples across decades but does not identify new state-level sanctions imposed on the U.S. starting in 2020 [1], and the specialized analyses and government pages provided focus on U.S. sanctions outbound rather than inbound retaliation [3] [4].
2. What the sources do document: historical retaliation and political pushback, not new 2020-era measures
The literature supplied outlines longstanding cases where countries have responded to U.S. measures—Russia’s 2014 agricultural bans and Iran’s post-1979 rupture are cited as past retaliatory steps—showing that retaliation against U.S. sanctions is not novel, but these examples predate 2020 rather than representing fresh declarations of sanctions against America since that year [1]. Analysts and institutions in the collection also trace growing global contestation of U.S. unilateral sanctions and the intensification of U.S. designations in 2020, but that trend refers to U.S. activity, not inbound sanctions [5] [2].
3. Distinguishing rhetoric, countermeasures and formal sanctions: sources conflate different responses
Several sources highlight how foreign governments publicly condemn U.S. unilateral sanctions as violations of international norms—China explicitly frames unilateral U.S. sanctions as human rights abuses and political tools [2]—and some states have enacted targeted measures like import bans or reciprocal trade steps historically [1]. The supplied government and university compliance pages, however, focus on OFAC’s lists of countries the U.S. sanctions (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Crimea, etc.), underscoring the asymmetry: U.S. lists and enforcement instruments are prominent in the record, whereas formal foreign sanctions lists targeting the U.S. after 2020 are not documented here [3] [4] [6].
4. Alternative interpretations and the limits of the available reporting
It is possible that narrower or partial measures—diplomatic sanctions, limited trade restrictions, or symbolic penalties—were adopted by certain governments since 2020 and are not captured in these sources; the corpus provided centers on U.S. sanctions policy, OFAC country lists, and historical reciprocity, meaning absence of evidence in these items is not definitive proof no state adopted any form of sanctioning measure against the U.S. after 2020 [3] [4]. Researchers seeking confirmation should consult official foreign government gazettes, multilateral institutions, and specialized trackers of measures against the U.S. beyond the OFAC-centric material here.
5. Hidden agendas and why reporting tilts toward U.S. outbound sanctions
The supplied sources predominantly come from U.S.-based agencies and policy shops that catalog U.S. sanctions programs (OFAC, BIS, CNAS) and therefore emphasize U.S. designations, compliance obligations, and the impacts of American pressure [3] [7] [5]. That framing risks understating or missing retaliatory actions by other states unless those actions are widely publicized and recorded in international trackers; conversely, foreign-state rhetoric that frames U.S. sanctions as illegitimate (China’s contention) is present but functions more as political counterargument than demonstrable formal sanction listings in this set [2].