Can you advise me on the countries that are currently members of S.A.F.E.?

1. What “membership” means for SAFE: borrowers versus participants

SAFE is not a club with members in the usual sense; it is an EU lending instrument: EU Member States are the entities eligible to request and receive SAFE loans, because the Commission borrows and on‑lends to Member States to finance joint defence projects ^{[1] [5]}. Third countries do not become “members” of the instrument; instead, SAFE’s rules allow non‑EU actors to participate in common procurement exercises or have their industry supply goods under capped foreign content and conditional arrangements ^{[2] [3]}.

2. Who can be direct recipients (the de‑facto “members” for loans)

The only entities explicitly eligible to obtain SAFE loans are EU Member States—this is the clearest delineation in the Commission’s materials and the explanatory coverage: the European Commission issues the loans and member states apply for them via national defence investment plans ^{[1] [6]}. Public reporting reiterates that while the programme is open to coordination with outsiders, only Member States can obtain the financial support itself ^{[3] [1]}.

3. Third‑country participants and a short list of named partners

SAFE’s design deliberately permits participation by “like‑minded” third countries in joint procurements and by companies established in EEA/EFTA states or Ukraine, subject to conditions; EU documentation and secondary reporting explicitly name Ukraine and the EEA/EFTA states as having parity in participation, and lists countries that have signed Security and Defence Partnerships—Albania, Canada, Japan, Moldova, North Macedonia, Norway, South Korea and the United Kingdom—as able to take part in common procurement under negotiated arrangements ^{[2] [4] [3]}.

4. Caps, conditions and the political angle

Third‑country participation is constrained: procurement contracts must limit non‑EU/EEA/Ukraine component costs (examples cite a 35% ceiling), and Category 2 projects carry stricter conditions on modification capacity and security guarantees; derogations for foreign‑controlled firms are possible only if extra safeguards are provided ^{[2] [3]}. This reflects a political trade‑off—Brussels wants upscaling fast but also aims to prioritise European industry, which explains the careful opening to trusted partners while protecting domestic supply chains ^{[3] [4]}.

5. What is public and what remains procedural or negotiable

European Commission pages, think‑tank analysis and defence press provide the framework and list of potential partner countries, but SAFE’s practical rollout depends on operational arrangements, bilateral or multilateral agreements, and case‑by‑case eligibility of projects; therefore a static, definitive “membership roster” beyond “EU Member States are borrowers” and the named third countries participating in procurements does not exist in a single up‑to‑date public list in the sources reviewed ^{[2] [1] [5]}. SAFE entered into force on 29 May 2025 and a €150 billion envelope is the headline finance figure framing these arrangements ^{[2] [4] [1]}.

6. Competing readings and hidden agendas to watch

Analysts differ on whether SAFE’s openness to allies represents pragmatic alliance management or a regulatory manoeuvre to favour EU industry while signaling strategic autonomy; IRIS and IISS coverage flag the novelty and political sensitivity of letting non‑EU defence suppliers in under tight conditions, and industry reporting highlights that SAFE aims to build EU industrial capacity rather than just fund off‑the‑shelf buys ^{[4] [7] [5]}. Readers should note the implicit agenda: the EU seeks both speed in capability build‑up and economic protection for domestic defence sectors, and that balance shapes which third countries get meaningful access ^{[3] [4]}.