Which demographic groups shifted most in Trump’s second term approval and how did that compare to shifts in Obama’s second term?

Checked on February 6, 2026
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Executive summary

Donald Trump’s second-term approval showed its largest movements among partisans (Republican consolidation and declining independent support), young and nonwhite voters reversing 2024 shifts, and regional/state divides that mirror partisan geography; several outlets report a snap-back toward Democrats among young, nonwhite and low-turnout voters [1] [2]. Comparable, reliable demographic detail for Barack Obama’s second-term approval is limited in the provided sources; what is available emphasizes Obama’s larger early-term plunge in aggregate approval but does not supply a clear, parallel demographic shift breakdown for his second term in these documents [3] [4].

1. The most volatile groups in Trump’s second term: partisans, independents and nonwhite voters

Polling averages and trackers show that the clearest moves in Mr. Trump’s second term were within partisan and near-partisan slices: Republican approval remained unusually high and stable while independents and some subgroups moved away, producing a widening partisan gap; Nate Silver’s aggregate reported a net approval drop and noted Trump was less popular than Obama had been at a comparable point [4]. The New York Times/Siena analysis finds that the “second Trump coalition” unraveled and that Democrats regained their usual advantage among young, nonwhite and low-turnout voters — signalling the biggest demographic reversals were among youth and nonwhite constituencies that had swung toward Trump in 2024 [1]. The Economist’s tracker reinforces the partisan geography: approval remains highest in Republican-leaning states and lowest in Democratic ones, implying state- and race-linked variation [2].

2. Issue-driven shifts: immigration, Middle East and the economy moved public opinion

Gallup and Reuters reporting tie substantive issue performance to demographic movement: Gallup reported erosion since February in approval for Trump’s handling of immigration (–9 points), the Middle East (–7) and the economy (–6), and noted Republicans’ and independents’ ratings worsened, with independents hitting historically low support — a pattern that explains part of the demographic shifts documented in other trackers [5]. Reuters’ coverage of immigration polling during January 2026 described a majority saying the administration had gone too far on immigration, an issue that disproportionately influences nonwhite and suburban voters and therefore helps account for movement among those demographics [6].

3. How this compares to Obama’s second term — the available evidence and its gaps

Aggregate comparisons show Obama experienced a sharper early decline in approval than Trump did at comparable early-term points — Statista highlights Obama’s “biggest plunge” early on, and Nate Silver’s series places Obama ahead of Trump in net approval one year into a second term [3] [4]. However, the supplied sources do not provide a detailed, consistent demographic-by-demographic time series for Obama’s second term that would let one mirror-for-mirror compare which specific groups shifted most under Obama versus Trump; the public materials here discuss aggregate trajectories and historical comparisons but lack the fine-grained subgroup movement for Obama’s second term needed for a definitive contrast [3] [4] [7].

4. Interpreting the patterns — narrative, measurement and incentives

Different outlets read the same numbers differently: The New York Times frames the shift as a snap-back for Democrats among young and nonwhite voters [1], while conservative commentary emphasizes consolidation of Trump’s base and continuity [8]. Polling aggregation challenges are real — FiveThirtyEight-style models and Nate Silver note house effects and pollster variance, so subgroup swings may be amplified or dampened depending on which polls are weighted [4]. The Economist and Gallup underline that geography and issue performance create predictable demographic contours: states and groups hit hardest by immigration or foreign-policy events shift more [2] [5].

5. Data limits, caveats and what’s needed to settle apples-to-apples comparisons

The reporting provided offers multiple high-quality snapshots of Trump’s second-term subgroup movement and clear statements that youth, nonwhite and low-turnout voters swung back to Democrats [1] [2] [5] [6], but it does not include a consistent demographic time series for Obama’s second term to permit a precise, quantitative comparison of “which groups shifted most” between the two presidents; that absence is material and prevents a fully symmetrical analysis without consulting additional poll microdata or pollster cross-tabs not present here [3] [4].

Bottom line

Available sources show the largest demographic swings in Trump’s second term were among independents, young voters, nonwhite voters and regionally in Democratic-leaning states — driven in part by backlash to immigration policy and foreign-policy events — while aggregate comparisons say Obama experienced a sharper early approval plunge but do not supply the subgroup-level time series in these materials necessary to quantify exactly how the two presidents’ demographic shifts rank against each other [1] [5] [3] [4].

Want to dive deeper?
Which polls show youth and nonwhite voters flipping back to Democrats after the 2024 election, and what were their cross-tabs?
How did approval among independents shift across presidents one year into second terms (Obama vs. Trump) in raw Gallup and YouGov data?
What role did immigration-related events in 2025–2026 play in shifting suburban and nonwhite voter approval, by pollster?