Has the Senate ever ended the filibuster by changing precedent instead of formal rule change?

1. What the question really means: precedent v. formal rule change

The distinction at issue is between changing the written standing rules of the Senate — which traditionally requires adherence to cloture and other formal processes — and altering how the Senate interprets or enforces those rules by creating new precedents through floor rulings and majority appeals of the chair; the latter changes practice without amending the text of a rule ^{[1] [4]}.

2. The nuclear option: precedent as tool, not text

The mechanism widely labeled the “nuclear option” makes explicit how precedent can substitute for a textual rule change: a presiding officer rules based on existing rules and precedents, then the ruling is appealed and overturned by a simple majority, thereby establishing a new precedent that future presiding officers can rely on ^[1]. That procedure has been used to lower the effective threshold to end debate on nominations by majority vote, not by formally rewriting Rule XXII but by setting and relying on new precedents ^{[1] [2]}.

3. The 2010s: concrete examples where precedent did the work

Senate Democrats in 2013 used this precedent‑setting route to allow most executive‑branch and lower‑court judicial nominations to be confirmed by a simple majority, a change accomplished through parliamentary rulings and majority votes rather than a formal rules rewrite ^{[3] [2]}. Republicans then extended that precedent in 2017 to include Supreme Court nominations after failing to invoke cloture on Neil Gorsuch, again relying on appeals and precedent rather than a textual amendment of cloture rules ^{[5] [1]}.

4. Why parties have chosen precedent over rule text

Majorities have often preferred precedent because formally changing standing rules can itself be trapped behind the very supermajority thresholds a change would alter; invoking a new precedent via appeal allows a majority to achieve an outcome with only a simple majority vote on the floor ^{[4] [1]}. That approach, however, is controversial because it substitutes a political majority’s interpretation for the written rule and can be perceived as eroding minority rights or institutional norms ^{[4] [6]}.

5. What has and has not been ended by precedent

While precedent changes in the 2010s effectively removed the 60‑vote threshold for many nominations, authoritative sources emphasize that the filibuster as a practice still remains for legislation, and that the Senate “adopted new precedents in the 2010s to allow a simple majority to end debate on nominations” while legislative filibusters persist ^{[2] [3]}. In short, precedent has been used to carve out handling of nominations but has not, according to these sources, formally abolished the filibuster for ordinary legislation ^{[3] [2]}.

6. Historical context and limits of the record

The Senate’s history shows many instances where practice evolved through precedents — for example, the move away from the “talking filibuster” to the two‑track system in the 1970s was a procedural evolution that altered how filibusters operated without a single dramatic textual rewrite ^{[7] [8]}. Available sources document the modern precedent pathway clearly for nominations in the 2010s but do not claim that every historical change to filibuster practice avoided formal rule amendments, so the record supports a measured conclusion: yes, precedent has been used successfully to end or neutralize the filibuster in specific domains, most conspicuously nominations, while legislative filibuster changes remain a separate, harder threshold ^{[7] [2]}.