What are 287(g) agreements and how do they affect local law enforcement incentives?
Executive summary
The 287(g) program is a federal mechanism that deputizes selected state, local, and tribal officers to perform defined immigration-enforcement functions under ICE supervision, and it has shifted incentives inside many police agencies by tying federal resources, political rewards, and operational priorities to immigration enforcement activities [1] [2]. Proponents frame 287(g) as a force-multiplier that improves public safety and offers training and reimbursements, while critics warn it creates perverse financial, political, and enforcement incentives that can erode community trust and encourage profiling [3] [4] [5].
1. What 287(g) agreements are and how they are authorized
Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Department of Homeland Security, through ICE, to enter MOAs with state, local, or tribal law enforcement agencies that delegate specific immigration officer functions to trained, designated officers who operate under ICE oversight for a defined period and scope [1] [2]. ICE and multiple legal and policy organizations describe three primary models historically used — jail enforcement, warrant service, and task force — each limiting different functions and settings where local officers may act in the name of federal immigration law [6] [3].
2. The mechanics: models, training, and supervisory controls
Under MOAs, participating officers receive ICE training in immigration law and are supervised by ICE to perform delegated duties such as issuing detainers, identifying removable noncitizens in jails, or assisting in warrants and investigations, though the exact powers depend on the model the agency signs up for [1] [6]. ICE publicly emphasizes training, multicultural communication, and anti-profiling instruction as part of the program and positions 287(g) as a tool to “keep communities safe” by targeting serious criminal aliens [3] [6].
3. Financial and institutional incentives created or strengthened by federal policy
Recent policy shifts and legislation have introduced explicit financial inducements—reimbursement programs and salary coverage—for agencies participating in 287(g), making federal funding an active lever encouraging enrollment and expanded local participation [7] [8]. DHS and ICE statements tout large increases in MOAs and a reimbursement regime as incentives, while commentators and watchdog groups counter that the dollars offered can mask real costs such as litigation, administrative burden, and decreased public cooperation [4] [9].
4. Political, career, and organizational incentives at the local level
Because many participants are county sheriffs—elected officials who run jails—signing 287(g) can become a campaign platform and visible demonstration of toughness on immigration, creating electoral incentives to adopt or expand agreements even where agency resources are strained [10] [11]. Policy analyses note that sheriffs and other local leaders often weigh potential political capital and federal support against costs, which can tilt decision-making toward participation in jurisdictions where political payoff outweighs community-relations concerns [10] [2].
5. Effects on policing priorities, civil rights concerns, and community trust
Research and advocacy groups report that 287(g) participation changes policing incentives by broadening the set of enforcement priorities local agencies pursue, encouraging immigration-related stops, detainer requests, and information-sharing that critics link to racial profiling, family separations, and declines in immigrant cooperation with police—outcomes that can make communities less safe overall by undermining trust [12] [13] [5]. ICE and DHS argue the program focuses on “the worst of the worst” and provides oversight to limit civil rights violations, but oversight failures, variability in training, and documented abuses in past task-force implementations have fed skepticism about how well those safeguards work in practice [4] [14] [11].
6. Bottom line: incentives reshape local law enforcement behavior, for better and worse
287(g) agreements reconfigure local incentives by offering federal tools, training, and increasingly direct financial reimbursement that encourage agencies to prioritize immigration enforcement, while simultaneously introducing electoral and managerial pressures for sheriffs and chiefs to showcase cooperation with ICE; the net effect varies by jurisdiction but consistently raises trade-offs between short-term enforcement metrics and long-term community trust and civil-rights risk [3] [8] [10]. Available reporting documents both the administration’s push to expand the program with reimbursements and the civil-rights community’s warnings about profiling and fear—evidence that the incentives built into 287(g) are both practical (dollars, training, authority) and political (visibility, campaign messaging), and that those incentives materially change local law-enforcement behavior [7] [5] [4].