What presidents have wanted to buy greenland
Executive summary
Presidents and senior U.S. officials have eyed Greenland repeatedly from the 19th century to today: Andrew Johnson and his circle explored Greenland after the Alaska purchase; William Howard Taft’s diplomats proposed a land-exchange in the early 20th century; Harry S. Truman made a formal postwar bid in 1946; Pentagon and White House planners kept interest alive through the Eisenhower years; Vice‑presidential and cabinet figures floated ideas in the 1970s; and Donald Trump publicly pursued a purchase and later renewed expansionist rhetoric in 2019 and the 2020s [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8].
1. Andrew Johnson and the 19th‑century Arctic curiosity
As the United States completed the Alaska deal in 1867, President Andrew Johnson and allies contemplated Greenland as another Arctic acquisition, with advisers and former officials urging Congress to consider purchasing Greenland from Denmark much as Alaska had been secured, a thread chronicled in several historical summaries of U.S. expansionism [3] [9] [1].
2. Taft and an early 20th‑century diplomatic swap
In the early 1900s the question resurfaced not as a straight sale but as a diplomatic land-exchange engineered by U.S. diplomats under President William Howard Taft, who explored trading territory for Greenland in a complex plan that ultimately failed when Denmark rejected the idea [2] [5].
3. Truman’s 1946 gold offer and the Cold War calculus
The clearest formal offer came after World War II: President Harry S. Truman’s administration proposed buying Greenland for roughly $100 million in gold, a strategic move driven by emergent Cold War concerns about Arctic defense and basing that Denmark refused [3] [4] [9] [10].
4. Pentagon interest in the Eisenhower era and the 1955 proposal
Defense planners never abandoned the issue: Pentagon memoranda and the Joint Chiefs continued to push for a firmer U.S. foothold in Greenland during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency, with recorded proposals and memos indicating the military’s enduring appetite for Greenlandic control even though no new formal purchase offer was made in 1955 [5] [6].
5. Cold War echoes, 1970s suggestions and resource motives
Interest flared again intermittently—vice‑presidential figures in the 1970s, notably Nelson Rockefeller’s circle, discussed Greenland for its mineral promise and strategic value—illustrating that political, economic and military motives have repeatedly animated U.S. thinking about the island [6].
6. Donald Trump: public pursuit, private backers, and renewed expansionism
Donald Trump revived and publicized the idea in 2019, was rebuffed by Denmark and Greenland (“Greenland is not for sale”), and has since escalated rhetoric during his later presidency, driven in part by advisers and wealthy confidants who reportedly promoted the idea; reporting documents both his public statements advocating acquisition and private influences such as Ronald Lauder encouraging Arctic expansion [6] [8] [11] [12] [7].
7. Continuities, competing agendas and who benefits
Across eras the motivation mix is consistent—strategic basing, raw materials, Arctic influence—but the actors and methods differ: 19th‑century expansionists saw territorial growth as manifest destiny, mid‑20th‑century planners prioritized Cold War basing, and contemporary advocates tie Greenland to critical minerals and great‑power competition, with private business interests sometimes intersecting with White House impulses, as reporting on Lauder’s role suggests [9] [5] [11] [13].
8. What the record does—and does not—show
The documentary record confirms multiple presidential or high‑level U.S. efforts to acquire Greenland: exploratory diplomacy under Andrew Johnson, Taft’s exchange proposal, Truman’s $100 million offer, Pentagon pressure in the Eisenhower years, periodic political suggestions in later decades, and Donald Trump’s very public bids in 2019 and the 2020s [1] [2] [3] [5] [6] [8]. Sources diverge on motives, the seriousness of each effort, and the roles of private actors; where contemporary reporting alleges threats of force or annexation in 2025–26, reliance is on recent press accounts and political statements rather than settled diplomatic record [8] [11] [7].