What are the current projections for Muslim population in Europe by 2050?

1. The headline projections: three scenarios, three outcomes

Pew’s framework models three scenarios: zero migration (no future net migration), medium migration (continuation of recent regular flows), and high migration (continuation of the 2014–2016 refugee surge), producing a Europe-wide Muslim share of about 7% in the zero scenario, roughly 11.2% in the medium scenario, and up to about 14% under the high scenario by 2050 ^{[1] [2] [4]}.

2. Numbers behind the percentages: populations and ranges

Different outlets report the raw numbers slightly differently depending on definitions and baselines: Pew’s graphs and media summaries put projected Muslim totals between roughly 30–75 million by 2050 depending on scenario — for example, about 35.8 million in one medium estimate and as high as 71–75 million in high-migration interpretations cited by major press ^{[2] [3] [5]}.

3. Why the scenarios diverge: fertility, age structure, migration and conversion

Pew stresses that three demographic factors drive divergence: Muslims in Europe are on average younger and have higher fertility than non-Muslims, which continues population momentum even without migration; migration composition and volume radically shift the outcome — the high scenario assumes sustained refugee-scale flows like 2014–16; and religious switching (conversion) plays a small role compared with births and migration according to the study ^{[1] [2] [4]}.

4. Country-level variation: some states could see much larger changes

The projected continent-wide share masks big national differences: under Pew’s scenarios Germany, France, Sweden and the UK show very different outcomes — for instance Germany could be around 9–20% Muslim by 2050 depending on scenario and Sweden’s share stretches to 11–31% across zero-to-high scenarios in Pew’s modelling — illustrating that migration destinations and past inflows shape local demography far more than continent-wide averages ^{[1] [6]}.

5. How these numbers are used, and abused, in discourse

The projections have been amplified into alarmist narratives and disinformation — agencies tracking misinformation caution that selective quoting or worst‑case numbers are sometimes framed as inevitabilities, producing claims that “Europe will become Islamic” which misrepresent Pew’s cautious scenario approach and underestimate uncertainty ^{[7] [5]}. Reputable outlets cite Pew but the framing matters: the centre itself emphasizes these are conditional projections, not predictions ^{[1] [7]}.

6. Limits, uncertainties and what the models don’t capture

Pew and other analysts warn the biggest unknowns are future migration policy, geopolitical events that create refugee flows, long-term fertility convergence between groups, and rates of assimilation or religious disaffiliation — variables that can shift outcomes materially and are inherently unpredictable over decades ^{[1] [2] [8]}. Some older or alternative estimates (e.g., academic or Europarl summaries) offer different higher or lower bounds, reflecting methodological differences and the sensitivity of long-range demographic modelling ^{[8] [9]}.

7. Bottom line: plausible range and practical takeaway

The defensible headline is that Europe’s Muslim population is projected to rise by mid‑century, with a plausible continent-wide share around 11% under a medium‑migration scenario but with credible bounds from roughly 7% (no further migration) to the low‑to‑mid teens under sustained high migration; national outcomes will vary substantially and all figures depend heavily on future migration and fertility trends rather than any single inevitability ^{[1] [2] [3]}.