Can "secure cloud storage" used by file hosting companies able to be crawled by things like project aracnhid and the IWF carlwer
Executive summary
Project Arachnid and the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) run automated crawlers that scan web pages and compare media against databases of known child sexual abuse material (CSAM) using hashing and signature techniques [1] [2]. These tools operate primarily on reported or publicly accessible URLs and through voluntary platform integrations (Shield), and the available reporting does not show they can inherently bypass access controls on private or authenticated "secure cloud storage" without an accessible URL or platform cooperation [3] [4].
1. How Arachnid and IWF crawlers actually work — public URLs and hashing
Project Arachnid’s engine compares media on crawled pages to a hash database of known CSAM to identify matches and then issues notices or informs partners and law enforcement [5] [1], while the IWF’s crawler likewise uses PhotoDNA-style scanning and database matching to flag suspect images for human verification [2]. Both systems are described as following links found on pages to discover additional material and pushing matched content into databases for verification and takedown workflows [2] [5].
2. Scope of crawling — reported domains, Shield opt-in and depth limits
Multiple sources emphasize that Arachnid targets URLs reported to Cybertip.ca or submitted via Arachnid’s API and that Arachnid also offers a Shield program that platforms can sign up to have scanned proactively [3] [4]. The IWF crawler was designed with practical limits — for example, stopping crawling after limited depth when no material is found — reflecting a targeted rather than blanket web sweep [2]. Project literature and partner reporting frame the systems as proactive on reported or partner-supplied surfaces, not as unrestricted, undirected sweeps of every hosted file [3] [6].
3. What “secure cloud storage” means in practice — and what the sources say
The reporting focuses on crawling publicly reachable web pages, reported URLs, and partnered platform scans [5] [3] [4]; none of the provided sources claim Arachnid or IWF can transparently crawl private, access-controlled cloud buckets, password-protected file shares, or storage behind authentication flows without either an exposed URL or platform cooperation. The technical descriptions stress hash-comparison of media that the crawler can retrieve from accessible pages or partner feeds, which implies that accessibility is a precondition for automated detection [1] [2].
4. Practical scenarios: when secure cloud storage could be discovered
If a file in cloud storage is exposed via a publicly accessible URL, indexed link, or reported to a hotline — or if the storage provider opts into Shield-like scanning and provides access — Arachnid or IWF-style tooling can discover and match that file against known CSAM signatures [3] [4] [5]. Conversely, the reporting implies but does not empirically demonstrate that files completely behind authentication, private APIs, or unindexed object storage would remain outside normal crawler reach absent a report, leak, or provider cooperation [3] [2].
5. Competing perspectives, incentives and reporting limits
Advocates and project materials underscore survivor protection and rapid takedown as the driving purpose of Arachnid and IWF work [7] [1], while industry partners highlight compliance and blocking lists as operational complements [8]. At the same time, the sources do not address in technical detail whether and how these crawlers might be used to index storage behind sophisticated access controls or explore private cloud APIs, so any firm claim beyond “accessible URLs or provider cooperation allow detection” exceeds the documented reporting [5] [3].