What categories of communications would be subject to scanning under the EU chat control proposal?
Executive summary
The EU “Chat Control” debate centers on proposals to scan private communications for child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and grooming; critics say the original drafts would have required scanning of encrypted private messages and photos across services, while later Council texts softened or made scanning voluntary and introduced risk-based categories for services (claims summarized from news and advocacy sources) [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. What the phrase “subject to scanning” meant in early proposals
Early iterations of the Commission’s CSAM regulation (widely dubbed “Chat Control”) envisaged detection measures that would apply to “private digital communications,” including messages and photos, and explicitly alarmed critics because they would extend to encrypted communications via client-side or provider-side scanning — effectively touching the private chats of users of messaging apps and cloud services [1] [5] [6].
2. Types of communications flagged by supporters and opponents
Both supporters and opponents agree the law targets online channels where CSAM and grooming occur: messaging apps, social media DMs, email and cloud-stored images. Reporters and advocacy groups highlighted scanning of messages and photos as the central aim; opponents added that automatic analysis tools would be applied to those contents [2] [1] [5].
3. Encryption: headline concern and how texts evolved
A major flashpoint has been end‑to‑end encryption. Critics and some MEPs argued the original technical approach would require scanning encrypted messages or breaking encryption through client‑side analysis, undermining security; those concerns appear to have pushed the Council to remove a forced requirement to scan encrypted messages in some later Council compromises, although debate about indirect obligations persisted [6] [7] [8].
4. Voluntary versus mandatory scanning — the shifting legal posture
Negotiations shifted over 2024–2025: earlier drafts pushed mandatory scanning or detection orders, while later Council compromises moved toward voluntary or risk‑based obligations for providers — a change observers call a softening of the “mandatory scanning” idea, though watchdogs warn wording on “appropriate risk mitigation measures” could recreate de facto scanning duties [5] [3] [8].
5. Risk categories and which providers could face stronger duties
Recent Council texts reportedly introduce three risk categories for online services — high, medium, low — with those in the highest category potentially obliged to help develop or adopt risk‑mitigation technologies. That mechanism would not single out a technical method but could concentrate obligations on major messaging and cloud platforms deemed high‑risk [4] [3].
6. Automated analysis, false positives and collateral scope
Parliamentary questions and civil‑society sources flagged automated content‑analysis tools as central to the plan. Those tools produce false positives, which critics say risks innocent users being wrongly flagged; the proposal’s practical effect would therefore depend on what content types (text, images, video) are subject to automated matching and reporting [9] [5].
7. Political tug-of-war: member states, Parliament and civil society
Council negotiations through various presidencies saw swings: some member states blocked mandatory approaches, the European Parliament pushed for tighter safeguards and targeted, judicially supervised scans, and digital‑rights groups and companies campaigned against measures that would weaken encryption. This political friction explains why the scope of “communications subject to scanning” has repeatedly changed [10] [5] [2].
8. What the available sources do not settle
Available sources do not mention a final, consolidated legal text that definitively lists every category of communication that will be scanned once and if the regulation is adopted; they instead describe proposals, compromises and political positions and report on likely targets [8] [11]. Concrete technical rules (exact file types, thresholds, or precise obligation triggers) are not present in the cited reporting.
9. Stakes and competing perspectives
Proponents frame scanning as necessary to detect CSAM and protect children and propose targeted detection of messages and images on potentially abusive channels [2]. Opponents — privacy NGOs, many security experts and some tech firms — argue that scanning encrypted private communications undermines privacy and security, and that automated tools will create false positives and mass‑surveillance risks [12] [5] [6].
10. What to watch next
Follow Council texts for the definitive risk‑category rules and any residual language on “appropriate risk mitigation measures” that critics say could reinstate scanning obligations; also watch Parliament’s negotiating position, which has repeatedly tried to narrow scope and protect encryption — these two bodies will determine whether the law explicitly names which service types (messaging apps, social networks, email, cloud storage) and content formats (text, images) are in scope [4] [5] [8].