What role do EU data protection authorities play in approving or auditing CSAM scanning technologies?
Executive summary
EU data protection authorities — meaning national DPAs, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) — act largely as guardians and critics rather than as certifying engineers: they advise, issue guidance, demand impact assessments and have pushed for or recommended independent audits of CSAM-scanning technologies, and their formal powers to block or “approve” specific technical designs derive from GDPR enforcement tools and judicial processes rather than a discrete approval regime created by the CSAM proposal itself EDRi-principles-on-CSAM-measures.pdf" target="blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">[1] [2] [3].
1. Legal gatekeepers: advisory roles, opinions and enforcement options
Data protection bodies have been centrally involved in shaping how CSAM detection fits with EU privacy law — the EDPB and national DPAs have publicly criticized derogations and urged caution, and the Commission’s own proposal signals that detection technologies should be “consulted with data protection authorities,” placing DPAs in a consultative role during policy rollout [2] [3] [4]. At the same time, their concrete legal tools come from GDPR and national law: DPAs can require data protection impact assessments, impose fines or orders where processing is unlawful, and bring matters before courts, but the CSAM Regulation proposal itself foresees competent authorities issuing detection orders to providers rather than a standalone DPA “seal of approval” for a given technology [5] [6].
2. Scrutiny and audits: expectations versus current practice
Civil-society and expert writings flag audits and mandatory guidance as central safeguards: EDRi’s principles explicitly call for national DPAs and the EDPB to provide mandatory guidance on the permissibility of specific detection technologies and to require independent audits and evidence on bias and accuracy to limit false positives [1]. The parliamentary and policy briefings echo that independent verification and oversight will be necessary because automated tools — hashing, ML classifiers and proposed client-side scanning variants — carry demonstrable risks of errors and privacy intrusion [5] [1].
3. Consultation, databases and the new EU Centre: shared turf and friction
The Commission’s draft foresees an EU Centre that would create databases of “indicators” and support national competent authorities; the proposal also states technologies should be developed “with” or “consulted with” data protection authorities, which positions DPAs as necessary interlocutors in designing indicators and detection orders but not as the ultimate operational managers of scanning systems [2] [5]. That architecture creates friction: DPAs and the EDPS have warned against broad monitoring and encryption-busting designs, signaling that they can shape what is politically and legally acceptable even if enforcement of detection orders would rest with judicial or administrative competent authorities [4] [7].
4. Political pressure and the practical influence of DPAs
Beyond formal powers, DPAs exert influence through public reasoned opinions and political pressure; the EDPB’s criticisms of interim derogations and repeated calls for minimally invasive measures have been cited in parliamentary debates and extensions of temporary rules, demonstrating that data watchdogs can slow or reshape policy trajectories even where they cannot unilaterally veto legislative designs [3] [8]. Industry reactions likewise show companies expect to have to “consult” DPAs and to factor supervisory expectations — for instance, around risk assessments, reporting limits and minimisation — into product choices [6] [9].
5. Limits, ambiguity and unanswered questions
Reporting and policy briefs reveal clear gaps: existing documents show DPAs should provide guidance, require DPIAs and be involved in audits, but they do not establish a single EU-level certification regime for CSAM detection tools, nor do they fully resolve how DPAs will audit opaque ML models or client-side scanners in practice; independent-audit mandates are advocated by NGOs and some policy analyses, but the legislative texts primarily create detection-order pathways and an EU Centre for indicators, leaving operational auditing arrangements partly unspecified [1] [5] [2]. Where sources are silent, it must be acknowledged that the precise modalities — who conducts audits, what standards will be binding, and how conflicts between DPAs and competent authorities are adjudicated — remain contested and subject to further legislative and judicial development [1] [5].