When an image on device camera roll is seletected and moved to my eyes only on Snapchat is that process completely private or is it still subject to moderation when is the content encrypted

Checked on January 26, 2026
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Executive summary

Moving an image from a phone’s camera roll into Snapchat’s My Eyes Only does put that file behind an extra, passcode-protected encrypted layer inside the Snapchat app, but it is not an absolute guarantee of invisibility or immunity from all forms of access or analysis; the protection is strongest against casual viewers and Snapchat’s own support staff, yet weaker against device compromise, forensic recovery, or any copies/backups outside the vault [1] [2] [3].

1. What the feature actually does: local passcode and encryption

Snapchat’s documentation and product pages describe My Eyes Only as a passcode‑protected folder in Memories that requires entering a separate PIN to view items moved there, and the company repeatedly states the content is encrypted and protected behind that code so even support cannot read it [2] [4] [3].

2. When the content becomes encrypted — and where it lives

The workflow requires saving a Snap or importing a camera‑roll image into Memories and then moving it into My Eyes Only; at that point Snapchat’s materials and reporting treat the content as placed into an encrypted vault tied to the My Eyes Only passcode [2] [1]. Whether the item is only on the device or also backed up to Snapchat’s cloud is described inconsistently in third‑party guides: Snapchat says Memories can be backed up online to prevent loss [4], while some coverage and how‑to guides emphasize local encryption tied to the passcode and warn that content remains inaccessible if the passcode is lost [5] [1].

3. Does Snapchat or moderators see vaulted images? The company’s position

Snapchat’s official and support statements present My Eyes Only as intentionally inaccessible to Snapchat without the user’s passcode — framing it as a privacy feature that “even we can’t access” [3] [4]. That implies My Eyes Only content is not subject to routine content moderation processes that would scan public or submitted content like Spotlight or Snap Map, which Snapchat flags as public and processed for selection [4]. No provided source, however, explicitly documents Snapchat moderators reviewing My Eyes Only contents.

4. Practical limits: device compromise, caches and forensic tools

Security researchers and forensic practitioners have documented ways My Eyes Only material can be recovered in real‑world conditions: forensic tools and workflows (AXIOM, GrayKey, application media cache examination) have been shown to recover and decrypt Memories and My Eyes Only snaps in many situations when data was present in local caches or acquired from the device filesystem [6]. Community posts and GitHub projects also reveal that the My Eyes Only PIN and related artifacts are stored in app databases on Android devices (encrypted or hashed with bcrypt), which can be targeted on rooted or seized devices [7].

5. Edge cases: backups, forgotten PINs, and deletions

If a user forgets the My Eyes Only PIN, Snapchat’s procedures warn that resetting the PIN will delete the vault’s content — a design choice prioritizing secrecy over recoverability [2] [5]. Guides differ on whether content is strictly local or can be recovered from backups; Snapchat’s messaging about Memories being backed up complicates a simple privacy claim because backed‑up copies could be subject to different retention or access policies [4] [5].

6. Bottom line: private to an extent, not absolutely private or moderation‑immune

The most defensible conclusion from the sources is that My Eyes Only provides strong, passcode‑based encryption to prevent casual access and (according to Snapchat) to prevent even company employees from viewing vaulted items [3] [4]. That protection is not absolute: if the device is compromised, if forensic acquisition captures unencrypted caches, if the PIN or app database is extracted on rooted/seized devices, or if the image exists outside the vault (camera roll, backups, or submissions to public features), the content can be exposed or analyzed [6] [7] [5]. The sources reviewed do not provide direct evidence that Snapchat’s content moderation systems examine My Eyes Only files, but they do show how operational realities (backups, caches, device access) can create exceptions to the “for your eyes only” promise [4] [6].

Want to dive deeper?
How can digital forensics recover encrypted app vaults like Snapchat My Eyes Only from seized phones?
What are Snapchat’s policies and technical practices for backing up Memories and how do they affect user privacy?
Have there been documented cases where law enforcement accessed My Eyes Only content and on what legal/technical grounds?