Snapchat my eyes only uploads and their privacy or server side scanning

1. What Snapchat officially says about My Eyes Only

Snap’s privacy materials and product pages define My Eyes Only as a special area for Memories that is encrypted and protected behind a passcode chosen by the user, and they explicitly describe it as “private content” alongside Snaps and Chats ^{[3] [1]}. Snapchat’s support documentation explains the user workflow for moving Snaps and Stories into My Eyes Only and frames the feature as intended to keep items “extra private” behind that password ^{[4] [7]}. Snap’s product blog and privacy‑by‑product pages go further, asserting that even if someone steals a device and logs in, those items remain safe without the My Eyes Only password, and they state that “no one can view these things after they are saved in My Eyes Only — not even us” ^[1].

2. What that claim means — and what it does not prove

Corporate claims of encryption and inaccessibility are meaningful statements of policy and product design intent, and they matter for user expectations; Snap’s privacy policy and help pages make those claims prominently ^{[3] [2]}. However, the documents in the reporting are company statements and support articles — not independent audits or technical whitepapers demonstrating the cryptographic model, key management, or whether any server‑side processes can access decrypted content. The available sources do not include external verification or a detailed technical specification showing that keys are exclusively client‑held or that no server‑side scanning occurs for My Eyes Only content ^{[3] [1]}.

3. Where users’ concerns come from and what reporting shows

Public commentary and forums capture user anxiety that staff or automated systems might snoop on My Eyes Only content; several consumer articles and forum threads repeatedly ask whether Snapchat employees can see vault contents and urge caution ^{[5] [6] [8]}. These pieces reflect legitimate questions about any cloud‑backed “vault” product: if backups are stored on company servers, users commonly worry about internal access, compelled disclosure to law enforcement, or automated scanning. The sources provided document the existence of these user fears but do not supply proof that Snap violates its stated My Eyes Only protections ^{[5] [6]}.

4. Broader privacy posture in Snap’s own materials

Snap’s privacy statements also explain other platform behaviors that are relevant context: Snapchat says it scans URLs sent on the platform to check for harmful webpages and that some features (like object detection used in Lenses) involve algorithmic analysis, while also asserting that Snaps and Chats delete by default and are not scanned to personalize ads ^{[3] [1]}. Those admissions show Snap operates server‑side processes for safety and product features; they do not, in the materials supplied, extend those scanning claims to content explicitly placed in My Eyes Only ^{[3] [1]}.

5. Bottom line and reporting limits

Based on Snap’s official help and privacy pages, My Eyes Only is designed and described as a password‑protected, encrypted area that the company says cannot be viewed without the passcode ^{[4] [1]}. Independent skepticism is visible in media and forums, but the documents provided do not contain technical audits, forensic evidence, or legal records showing that Snap staff or automated server processes access My Eyes Only content; they also do not address compelled disclosure scenarios or the precise cryptographic key model, so definitive answers on server‑side scanning cannot be drawn from these sources alone ^{[5] [6] [8] [3]}. Consumers who need absolute guarantees should look for third‑party security audits, technical whitepapers from Snap, or legal disclosures that are not included in the reporting cited here.