How many civilians and combatants have independent organizations verified died in Gaza since October 2023, and how do methodologies differ?
Executive summary
Independent, third‑party tallies of deaths in Gaza since October 7, 2023 remain contested: U.N. systems say they only publish casualty records once incidents are independently verified [1], while composite databases like ACLED use source‑by‑source coding that often records IDF and Gaza Ministry of Health (MoH) claims without on‑the‑ground verification [2]; the MoH itself reported at least 51,266 deaths by April 2025 [3] and later figures cited in public sources rose into the tens of thousands [4], but independent organisations differ sharply on how many of those were combatants versus civilians because methodologies and data access diverge [2] [5].
1. How many deaths have independent organisations verified — the headline totals
The United Nations’ OCHA publishes casualties only after independent verification of incidents, a caveat it repeats on its casualty database and therefore does not incorporate every reported death until corroborated [1]; ACLED compiles a running dataset by coding reported fatalities from multiple sources, processing IDF claims first and then including MoH claims as unattributed fatalities remain, which means ACLED’s totals are constrained by available reports but not equivalent to on‑the‑ground forensic verification [2]. The Hamas‑run Ministry of Health reported at least 51,266 dead by April 2025, a figure cited widely and used as a reference point by U.N. agencies while being explicitly challenged by Israeli authorities [3], and public reporting later referenced still higher MoH totals running into the tens of thousands [4]. The OHCHR described “massive and unprecedented numbers of casualties” in Gaza but has been limited in direct access needed to independently verify the full tally [6].
2. Civilian vs. combatant counts — the contested split
Independent organisations and research groups diverge sharply on the civilian/combatant ratio because the MoH’s lists do not classify victims by combatant status and Israeli claims of large militant losses are often unverifiable externally [2] [3]. ACLED’s coding attempts to reconcile multiple sources and notes that processing IDF claims first makes it more likely that IDF‑asserted combatant deaths are recorded, while MoH‑sourced unattributed deaths tend to remain in the civilian category unless otherwise resolved, a methodological bias ACLED explicitly acknowledges [2]. Academic modelling published in Frontiers estimated a much lower share of combatants in the 2023 Gaza fatalities than in earlier conflicts — reporting a modelled combatant proportion of around 12.7% (95% UI: 9.7–15.4%) for 2023 based on early MoH data and demographic assumptions — a result that implies a majority civilian toll under that model but depends on strong assumptions about age and sex distributions [7].
3. Why independent verification is so hard — access, methodology and incentives
Verification is hampered by restricted access for U.N. investigators and human rights bodies, the closure or evacuation of hospitals that previously fed MoH counts, and the MoH’s switch among several methodologies including hospital/morgue aggregation and reliance on media sources in areas where verification was impossible, all of which independent analysts have flagged as reducing transparency [5] [8] [9]. ACLED cautions it cannot verify claims on the ground and therefore relies on reported attributions, producing a dataset shaped by which actor’s claim is processed first and by the granularity of source reporting [2]. Policy analysts and think tanks have pointed to incentives for over‑ or undercounting by parties to the conflict, with critics arguing that MoH methodology shifts and the Gaza Government Media Office produce inconsistent age/sex profiles, while Israeli figures asserting large militant casualty totals are likewise disputed and difficult to corroborate independently [9] [10] [11].
4. What independent organisations can and cannot say with confidence
Independent organisations can document verified incidents where multiple sources or forensic access permit corroboration and can describe methodological limitations publicly — OCHA explicitly posts only independently verified incidents and flags uncertainty [1] — but they cannot, given current access limits and source disagreements, deliver a universally accepted breakdown of civilians versus combatants that both sides will accept. ACLED provides transparent coding rules and source notes so users can see how attributions were made, but it warns its totals reflect source availability and processing order rather than definitive battlefield adjudication [2]. Scholarly models provide one avenue to estimate likely combatant proportions but rest on assumptions and limited early data, producing estimates such as the Frontiers model’s ~12.7% combatant share for 2023 that should be read as model output rather than incontrovertible fact [7].
Conclusion
Independent organisations have verified many individual deaths and compiled large datasets, but there is no single independently agreed tally that cleanly separates civilians from combatants; publicly cited MoH totals reached tens of thousands by 2025 [3] [4], ACLED records and codes claims with transparent but biased rules [2], and academic modelling suggests a high civilian proportion under specific assumptions [7]; the disagreement stems less from arithmetic than from access limits, shifting MoH methodologies, and contrasting source‑processing rules that make an unequivocal civilian/combatant split impossible to assert from the available reporting [1] [5] [9].