How mny of US trde prtners chge the US higher triiffs thn we chrge them?
Executive summary
There is no single authoritative count in the available reporting that lists how many U.S. trading partners currently charge Americans higher tariffs than the United States charges them; the sources document sweeping U.S. tariff hikes and a range of retaliatory measures but do not provide a complete, country-by-country, apples‑to‑apples comparison of applied tariff rates for all partners [1] [2] [3]. Reporting shows that recent U.S. policy dramatically raised American applied tariffs, prompting some partners to threaten or impose retaliatory levies, yet the mix of exemptions, bilateral deals, and temporary truces means any simple numeric answer would be incomplete without deeper, up‑to‑date tariff matrices [4] [5] [2].
1. What the U.S. did to its tariffs — and why that matters
From early 2025 the U.S. sharply raised effective tariff rates across many goods, with headline moves including broad IEEPA‑based tariffs and sectoral actions that pushed the overall average U.S. applied tariff well above historical norms and toward double digits—or higher in some product lines—creating the context in which reciprocation became politically and economically likely [1] [6] [2]. Analysts and policy trackers estimate the U.S. average tariff rose substantially—Tax Policy Center and other trackers put the average tariff on all imports in recent policy scenarios in the mid‑teens to low‑twenties percent range depending on whether announced measures take full effect—so the baseline U.S. rate against which partners might reciprocate is itself volatile and disputed [2] [6].
2. Retaliation: scattered, targeted, and often partial
Several major partners publicly threatened or did impose retaliatory tariffs in response, with the EU, China, and some European states among those either announcing measures or holding large retaliatory lists, but the scope and depth of those retaliations vary by product and were often calibrated as bargaining chips rather than mirror‑image hikes [3] [7] [8]. The Congressional Research Service and news outlets document episodic reductions, temporary truces, and extensions—for example U.S.–China tariff reductions and extensions of exclusions—showing that tit‑for‑tat escalation is neither universal nor constant, and that negotiated deals have lowered some bilateral tensions even as other disputes remain [4] [9].
3. Why a simple count is elusive in the sources
None of the provided pieces supply a complete, contemporaneous tariff table comparing applied rates by importing partner on U.S. exports against U.S. applied rates on imports from that partner; instead the reporting offers snapshots—announced U.S. tariffs, selected retaliatory lists, aggregate estimates of average rates, and accounts of bilateral deals—so a precise “how many charge the U.S. higher tariffs than we charge them” figure cannot be confidently extracted from these sources alone [2] [1] [10]. Further complications: many tariffs are product‑specific, some countries’ measures are suspended or phased, and U.S. tariffs themselves have exemptions and firm‑specific carve‑outs, meaning “higher” depends on the basket of goods chosen for comparison [2] [11].
4. What the available evidence suggests in qualitative terms
Qualitatively, the balance of evidence points to a world in which U.S. tariffs rose so sharply that for many partners the U.S. applied rate now exceeds typical applied rates those partners levy on U.S. goods—especially relative to long‑standing WTO‑bound averages around a few percent—but important exceptions and retaliatory sets exist, notably between the U.S. and China or the EU where both sides have weaponized tariffs at times [12] [6] [3]. Major partners have both the economic leverage to retaliate and the political motivation to do so (Europe) or have engaged in negotiated stand‑downs and partial rollbacks (China), which yields a mixed picture rather than a clean majority/minority verdict [7] [4].
5. How to get a definitive number and why it would matter
A definitive answer requires constructing a contemporaneous, product‑weighted comparison of applied tariff schedules for each partner against the U.S. applied rates on imports from that partner—taking into account exclusions, firm‑level waivers, and temporary suspensions—and then tallying countries where the partner’s effective average on U.S. exports exceeds the U.S. effective average on its imports, a task suited to specialized tariff trackers or official tariff databases such as WTO, USTR, or customs harmonized schedules [10] [2]. Absent that granular exercise, policy discussion should focus on the evident risks: heightened trade uncertainty, negotiated patchworks of exemptions, and macroeconomic costs documented by institutions like the IMF and major banks when broad tariff increases apply [13].