How have federal courts divided on whether common‑law simple assault is an element of 18 U.S.C. §111?

1. Statutory starting point: what § 111 actually says

The statute criminalizes six categories of conduct—“forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes”—and draws a statutory distinction between “simple assault” (a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year) and assault involving physical contact or other aggravating facts (with higher penalties) ^{[4] [5]}.

2. The Ninth Circuit: at least some form of assault required

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that convictions under § 111 “require at least some form of assault,” explaining that the statute’s language must be read to demand force or threatened force rather than mere appearance or verbal interference, and that jury instructions should reflect that threshold (United States v. Chapman and model jury instructions in the Ninth Circuit) ^{[1] [6]}.

3. The Seventh Circuit: no separate assault element necessary

By contrast, the Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge that an indictment which alleged only that the defendant “resisted, intimidated and interfered” was defective for failing to allege “assault,” holding that the government may prove a § 111(b) conviction by establishing any one of the six statutory acts and that an independent common‑law assault element is not required (United States v. Stands Alone) ^[2].

4. The Tenth Circuit and others: a mixed, fact‑specific approach

The Tenth Circuit’s opinions—most prominently in United States v. Gonzales—have been read by petitioners to require a showing that conduct amounted to an assault in some contexts, and the Tenth’s approach figured in briefing when the Supreme Court was asked to resolve the circuit split; the government’s cert‑stage brief argued that § 111’s history and predecessors support treating the statute as covering non‑assaultive conduct as well ^{[7] [3]}.

5. Why the circuits diverge: text, history, and criminal‑law instincts

Courts reaching opposite results split along two analytic lines: one focuses on the statute’s text and history, emphasizing the separate statutory enumeration of six acts and a historical lineage that treated non‑assaultive resistance as punishable; the other emphasizes criminal‑law principles that a § 111 prosecution should require some showing of assault‑type force or threatened force to avoid criminalizing mere nonviolent interference ^{[3] [8] [1]}.

6. How the disagreement matters in practice

The divergence affects indictment drafting, jury instructions, and the kinds of cases prosecutors can pursue: in circuits like the Ninth, prosecutors must tie § 111 charges to force or credible threat; in circuits like the Seventh, they may rely on proof of other “forcibly …” acts without invoking traditional assault definitions—an important difference for defendants charged after protests, arrests, or tense encounters with federal officers ^{[1] [2]}.

7. Competing agendas and the route to resolution

The government has urged courts to interpret § 111 broadly—pointing to legislative history and prior statutory formulations to justify convicting non‑assaultive conduct—while defense advocates press for narrowing readings that preserve the common‑law assault boundary; those competing agendas, reflected in appellate briefs and model jury instruction debates, helped produce the current split that the Supreme Court has been asked to settle ^{[3] [7]}.

8. What reporting does and does not establish

Available reporting and court materials establish the split among circuits—most notably Ninth versus Seventh and contested positions in the Tenth—and document the statutory text and penalty structure; the sources do not provide a completed Supreme Court ruling resolving the split, so whether a final nationwide rule will be imposed remains outside the present record ^{[4] [2] [7]}.