How have federal courts construed “forcibly” and “assault” under 18 U.S.C. §111 in the last five years?

1. The statutory baseline: six verbs plus the modifier “forcibly”

Section 111 criminalizes whoever “forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes” with designated federal officers while they perform duties, and Congress has adjusted penalties for physical contact and other circumstances over time, leaving a text in which the adjective “forcibly” modifies six disjunctive verbs ^{[6] [7] [8]}. That multi‑verb structure is central to competing interpretive theories: prosecutors read the statute to reach a wide range of forceful impediments, while some defendants and courts urge reading “forcibly” and the statute’s history to limit liability to conduct that fits common‑law assault concepts ^{[9] [4]}.

2. DOJ guidance and lower‑court practice: threats can be “forcible”

The Department of Justice’s Criminal Resource Manual interprets § 111 to encompass threats of force that reasonably cause a federal officer to anticipate bodily harm, treating such threats as satisfying “forcible assault” when they induce reasonable fear during official duties ^[1]. Model jury instructions in multiple circuits similarly define a forcible assault to include intentionally threatening another coupled with apparent ability that causes reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm, demonstrating how prosecutors and trial courts commonly instruct juries that non‑contact but menacing conduct can meet § 111’s “force” requirement ^{[2] [10]}.

3. Circuit split: some judges require an “assault” element, others do not

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that convictions under § 111(a) require “at least some form of assault,” and its jury instructions reflect a conception of “forcible” that tracks classic assault definitions ^{[2] [10]}. By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Stands Alone rejected the proposition that common‑law simple assault is an essential element, holding that the government may prove liability by showing any one of the six “forcible” verbs and warning against rendering most verbs superfluous ^[3]. That division marks a substantive doctrinal disagreement about whether § 111 was meant to criminalize non‑assaultive forcible interference as well as classic assaults ^{[3] [5]}.

4. Practitioner accounts and sentencing consequences: “forcible” reaches protests and obstruction

Defense and practice guides emphasize the line courts draw between passive resistance and forcible conduct—pushing, grabbing, striking, or threatening displays of aggression—and note that prosecutors sometimes treat acts like blocking access or damaging property as evidence of forcible interference under § 111, with potential elevation to felony penalties where bodily injury or dangerous instruments are involved ^{[11] [12] [13]}. Those practical descriptions reflect how the statutory text, DOJ policy, and courts’ varying instructions converge to produce real prosecutorial leverage in demonstrations and resistance cases ^{[11] [12]}.

5. Litigation trajectory and remaining uncertainty

The Seventh Circuit’s Stands Alone decision produced a certiorari petition and a government brief defending the broader reading of § 111, but the materials in the public docket record the dispute rather than a definitive Supreme Court resolution, and available reporting does not resolve whether the high court has or will standardize the rule nationally ^{[4] [5]}. As a result, the last five years show an active, unresolved split: DOJ treats threats and forceful obstruction as within “forcibly,” some circuits require assaultive conduct, and appellate litigation continues to test the boundary between intimidation, obstruction, and common‑law assault under § 111 ^{[1] [2] [3]}.