Which U.S. court cases have resolved whether fictional written depictions of minors are obscene?

Checked on February 4, 2026
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Executive summary

Federal and appellate courts have grappled with whether fictional depictions of minors can be prosecuted as obscene, producing a mixed record: the Fourth Circuit upheld a conviction for obscene written and pictorial depictions under 18 U.S.C. §1466A in Dwight Whorley’s case, lower courts have both sustained and narrowed prosecutions involving fictional material (including Karen Fletcher and United States v. Handley), and the U.S. Supreme Court has left unresolved the constitutionality of prosecuting purely fictional text absent a finding of obscenity under Miller v. California [1] [2] [3] [4].

1. The Whorley precedent: Fourth Circuit says obscene fiction can be punished

The most prominent appellate decision directly answering whether fictional depictions can be obscene is the Fourth Circuit’s affirmation of Dwight Whorley’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. §1466A for receiving and distributing graphic anime cartoons and text-only descriptions that the jury found obscene, with the court holding the statute constitutional so long as the material is obscene under the Miller test [1] [2].

2. Karen Fletcher and other prosecutions: guilty pleas and contested obscenity findings

Prosecutions beyond visual-only cases have occurred: writer Karen Fletcher pled guilty after federal prosecutors successfully argued that subscription-based fictional stories met the legal standard for obscenity, a prosecution that drew national debate over where obscenity ends and protected literary expression begins [2]. These cases demonstrate prosecutors can—and have—targeted purely textual sexual writings involving minors when courts allow Miller-based obscenity instructions [2].

3. Handley and the limits of overbroad statutory language

United States v. Handley (S.D. Iowa) resolved contested statutory issues rather than eliminating the government’s power to pursue fictional material: Judge Gritzner held parts of the PROTECT Act facially overbroad where they criminalized depictions without requiring proof of obscenity, but he also left intact obscenity prosecutions that must be decided under the Miller standard; the defendant ultimately pled guilty but the decision clarified that prosecutors must prove obscenity, not merely that an image is fictional [3].

4. Supreme Court guardrails: Miller, Ferber and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition

At the Supreme Court level, Miller established the three-part obscenity test still used to evaluate material (prurient interest, patently offensive sexual conduct as defined by law, and lack of redeeming value) and New York v. Ferber removed child pornography from First Amendment protection when real children are involved; Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition struck down CPPA provisions that swept in virtual depictions too broadly, underscoring that fictional or computer-generated sexual material is not automatically outside First Amendment protection unless it meets Miller or involves actual children [4] [5].

5. Bottom line: resolved in some circuits but Supreme Court has not squarely ruled on pure text

The result is a patchwork: the Fourth Circuit (Whorley) and several federal prosecutions show courts will sustain obscenity convictions for fictional written or drawn depictions of minors when a jury finds they meet Miller, while other rulings (Handley) and Supreme Court precedents (Ashcroft) restrict overbroad statutes and require careful application of Miller or Ferber protections; however, there is no definitive Supreme Court ruling that universally resolves purely textual fictional depictions of minors across all jurisdictions, leaving the law fact- and jurisdiction-dependent [1] [3] [5] [4].

Want to dive deeper?
What did the Fourth Circuit decide in United States v. Whorley and how has the Supreme Court treated that decision?
How did United States v. Handley limit prosecutorial reach under the PROTECT Act and what parts were found overbroad?
Which state statutes or recent laws expand child‑pornography definitions to include fictional or AI‑generated images, and how have courts reacted?