How have courts interpreted “obstruction of justice” in immigration aggravated-felony determinations after Pugin v. Garland?
Executive summary
The Supreme Court in Pugin v. Garland held that an offense may qualify as “relating to obstruction of justice” for the Immigration and Nationality Act’s aggravated-felony bar even if the crime does not require a pending investigation or proceeding, resolving a circuit split in favor of a broader reading [1] [2]. Lower courts have since applied that holding to sustain aggravated-felony removability where state offenses match the Board of Immigration Appeals’ generic conception of obstruction, while commentators warn the decision widens deportation exposure and leaves many doctrinal questions unresolved [3] [4].
1. The core holding: no pending-proceeding requirement
The Court’s majority held that the phrase “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” does not categorically require the government to show the defendant obstructed a pending investigation or official proceeding, meaning statutes that criminalize obstruction absent such a nexus can still be aggravated felonies for immigration purposes [1] [2]. That ruling directly overturned the Ninth Circuit’s contrary approach and affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s view that offenses like Virginia’s accessory-after-the-fact statute can match the INA’s obstruction ground even though they lack a pending-proceeding element [2] [5].
2. Deference to the agency and interpretive tools
The Court accepted the Board of Immigration Appeals’ construction of “obstruction of justice” as entitled to Chevron deference, treating the INA’s obstruction clause as ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation as reasonable, which further empowered the government’s immigration charging decisions [3] [6]. The Court also rejected applying the rule of lenity to narrow the statute, emphasizing that the INA is a civil deportation scheme and not a criminal penalty provision when construing the aggravated-felony list [3] [6].
3. How lower courts have applied Pugin to specific offenses
Post-Pugin decisions have enforced a categorical approach: courts compare state or federal elements to the BIA’s generic definition and sustain aggravated-felony findings when the elements require specific intent to hinder justice, as occurred with Virginia accessory-after-the-fact in Pugin and with witness-dissuasion statutes litigated in the companion Cordero-Garcia case [5] [7] [2]. Practice advisories and advocacy groups warn that offenses ranging from accessory statutes to witness-dissuasion and certain obstruction provisions that carry a one-year sentence now risk classification as aggravated felonies if elements align with the generic definition [8] [9].
4. Practical impact and critiques from defenders and scholars
Immigration practitioners and immigrant-rights organizations say Pugin lowers the bar for felony-based deportation, potentially turning convictions that do not target investigatory interference into grounds for mandatory detention and deportation, and creating retrospective and advisory uncertainty for defense counsel and noncitizens [4] [10]. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent warned the majority’s reliance on a subset of statutes risks importing “outlier” definitions and invites expansive government constructions that stray from what she described as the core meaning of obstruction [11].
5. Open questions and litigation trends going forward
Courts continue to wrestle with the limits of the BIA’s generic definition—how narrowly to construe “relating to obstruction,” which state statutes fall outside the match, and when lenity or other canons might still affect outcomes—so lower-court litigation and administrative guidance will determine how far Pugin expands removability in practice [9] [8]. Practitioners should expect more agency charging and more litigation over categorical matches and element-by-element analysis, with many factual permutations still beyond current reporting and awaiting adjudication [3] [6].